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I. INTRODUCTION
The information superhighway, or Internet, has caused a con-
siderable stir in the law and legal community over the last decade
and led to numerous questions. For example, practitioners have
asked what type of behavior constitutes criminal activity on the in-
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formation superhighway, and how should this criminal activity be
prosecuted t What about the right to free speech, the right to pri-
vacy, and other constitutional rights on the Internet and the effects
on anonymous remailers?2 What should we do about libel and inju-
rious speech claims over the Internet?3 How should we deal with
copyright infringement?4 Additionally, which court has jurisdiction
over parties committing wrongful conduct over the Internet?5
This list of legal concerns regarding the Internet is constantly
growing in scope and length. As the Internet grows, both in size6
and speed,7 it becomes more likely that massive quantities of soft-
1. Catherine Therese Clarke, From Criminet to Cyber-Perp: Toward an Inclusive Ap-
proach to Policing the Evolving Criminal Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REv. 191
(1996); Sean Adam Shiff, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for Obscene
and Indecent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 731 (1996) (discussing crimi-
nal liability on the Internet).
2. Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L.
REv. 117 (1996); Byron F. Marchant, On-Line on the Internet: First Amendment and Intellec-
tual Property Uncertainties in the On-Line World, 39 How. L.J. 477 (1996); Mitchel L. Win-
ick et al., Attorney Advertising on the Internet: From Arizona to Texas - Regulating Speech
on the Cyber-Frontier, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1487 (1996); Jeffrey E. Faucette, The Freedom
of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Obscenity Doctrine And A Frightened University's Censor-
ship of Sex on the Internet, 44 DUKE L.J. 1155 (1995) (discussing constitutional issues raised
by the Internet).
3. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1794
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995); Cubby v. Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States
v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (analyzing libel law and defamation on the Internet).
4. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal 1995); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla.
1993); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing copyright
infringement on the Internet).
5. For jurisdictional law on the Internet, see Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257, (6th Cir. 1996); California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp.
1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 687 F.2d 563 (2d
Cir. 1982). See also Gary L. Gassman, Moot Court Competition Bench Memorandum: Inter-
net Defamation: Jurisdiction in Cyberspace and the Public Figure Doctrine, 14 JOHN
MARSHALL J. COMPTrER & INFO. L. 563 (1996); Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction
and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J.
ScL. & TEcH. 339 (1996).
6. By late 1997, over 100 million computers were projected to be coupled together,
worldwide, across the Internet. See DOUGLAS E. COMER, INTERNETWORKING WITH TCP/IP 8
(2d ed. 1991) ("Within seven years of its inception, the Internet had grown to span hundreds of
individual networks located throughout the United States and Europe.... Both the size and
use of the Internet continued to grow much faster than anticipated.").
7. New telecommunication technologies, such as Integrated Services Digital Network
(ISDN), Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), and Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line
(ADSL), are capable of enabling megabit transmission rates, the likes of which will enable on-
line real-time video as well as speedy software communication never before seen in electronic
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ware and data structures8 will be purchased, transmitted, and hacked9
over the Intemet. l0 Further, many users consider software to have
fluid qualities, moving across state lines and national boundaries
with ease on the Internet." This fluid nature of software will only
increase with new innovations, such as the network computer (NC).12
The Internet, unlike other manufacturing environments, can enable
users to create millions of copies of software or data structures and
distribute these copies to millions of computer users within very
short periods of time. In essence, modem computers and the Inter-
net may be viewed as high speed micro-factories that can create and
copy software at an astounding rate. Even unsophisticated computer
users on the Internet can inflict extensive financial damage on soft-
long-distance communication. See BUD GATES & DONALD GREGORY, VOICE AND DATA
COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 477-554 (1996).
8. A data structure is defined as "a physical or logical relationship among data ele-
ments, designed to support specified data manipulation functions." IEEE STANDARD
COMPUTER DICTIONARY (1991).
9. "Hacking" a computer program is an electronic form of stealing or manner of ille-
gally copying the software or data structures from a rightful cyberspace possessor.
10. For example, technology referred to as "applets" is currently causing a technical stir
on the Web. An applet is a stripped-down, or locked, version of a software application that can
be downloaded from the Internet or an intranet. Applets enable the user to demo the full-
featured application. Certain software applications may be required to view or run the user's
data file. For example, if the data is created using Program A, the applet is code compatible
with Program A and allows the receiver to view the data even if the receiver does not have the
entire Program A at the receiving end. Any interception or theft of this data, however, will
also steal the applet which may result in patent infringement. See Jason Snell, Web Publish-
ing: Version Two, MACUSER, Jan. 1, 1997 for an example discussion of applets.
In addition, many computer games are now played over the Internet. One entity that en-
ables Internet game play is known as Total Entertainment Network (TEN). See PGL: PGL
Finals to be Webcast Live, M2 PRESSWIR, Feb. 2, 1998. Moreover, it is always possible for a
user to send a friend a game or program over the Internet whereby the software owner suffers
economic harm. Even worse, hackers can post these games at websites for thousands of people
to illegally download within a few hours.
11. Some envision that software will soon be commonly purchased over the Internet
without ever leaving the comforts of home. For some examples, see Internex Readies EC-
Based Sofnvare Purchase Service, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE NEWS, Nov. 18, 1996, available in
1996 WL 13830257; S.L. Millin, With Help from Release, Egghead Plans to Test Try-Before-
You-Buy Concept, SOFTWARE INDUSTRY REPORT, Nov. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8349536. However, increased availability of software on the Internet as a result of on-line
purchasing capabilities may lead to increased software hacking on the Internet.
12. A network computer (NC) is an inexpensive computer that executes software from a
remote location and does not store or execute software locally. Such configuration saves the
user money since the NC need not be equipped with the high-priced circuitry required to store
and handle software, locally (e.g., DRAM memory). However, an NC must access its software
along telecommunication interfaces, e.g., the Internet, more than other systems.
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ware manufacturers or owners in a very short period of time and
without any possibility of a preemptive warning.
In this technological environment, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and other countries' intellectual prop-
erty organizations 13 are issuing software patents which contain
newly-emerged software claim styles, such as software article of
manufacture patent claims, 14 Alappat means-plus-function software
patent claims,15 and software data structure patent claims. 6 These
software claims emerged in U.S. patent law during the 1994-1995
time period, and such claims are just now being granted in many
U.S. patent applications.17 However, what ultimately will happen
when these claims are infringed is still an unknown. Due to the re-
cent acceptance and use of these software patent claims, the author
did not locate case law or articles which specifically discuss the ap-
plication of these new software patent claims to either software or
data transfers on the Internet. However, similar lawsuits involving
the Internet, software, and computer technology have already begun
to appear in the copyright context. 8
13. See Naomi AZA ssia, Patent Protection for Software in Israel, 29 COMPUTER 90, 90-
91 (1996); Gert D. Kolle, Patentability of Softvare-Related Inventions in Europe: Law and
Practice Under the European Patent Convention, 27 IIC 660 (1995) (published by VCH Ver-
lagsgesellsehaft mbH, P.O. Box 10 11 61, D- 69451 Weinheim, Germany); Yoshikazu Tani,
Protection of Computer Software in Japan, PATENTS & LICENSING, Feb. 1996, at 7.
14. See infra Part I.C.1. See also In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(stating computer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, CDs,
and magnetic tape, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as articles'of manu-
facture and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. § § 102 and 103).
15. See infra Part I.C.2. See also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en
bane) (holding that novel software present on a known computer architecture "creates a new
machine").
16. See infra Part I.C.3. See also In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(finding that data structure is patentable since the data structure was viewed as being specific
electrical or magnetic structural elements in a computer memory).
17. With the new GATT rules, patents are issuing in roughly 2-3 years and are enforce-
able for twenty years from the filing date of the patent application. See Mark A. Lemley, An
Empirical Study of the Twenty Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994).
18. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368 (holding Internet access provider was not directly
liable for unauthorized copies of copyrighted work that were made and stored on its computer
while transmitting computer bulletin board service's (BBS) Usenet postings to and from the
Internet); Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (holding subscription com-
puter bulletin board service directly infringed magazine's copyrights by distributing copy-
righted photographs, even if bulletin board operator did not know that the photographs had
been uploaded by subscribers onto bulletin board); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp.
679, 686 (holding both the computer bulletin board company and the individual controlling
19981
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While an Internet user is capable of inflicting extensive finan-
cial damage in a short period of time, the nature of the Internet may
prevent a software owner from obtaining an adequate remedy. In the
future, software owners, who suffer financial damage due to hacking
on the Internet, will likely file software patent infringement lawsuits
to obtain a remedy due to any infringement of these new software
claims. In many cases, the hacker or thief performing the infringing
activity and causing the financial damage may be judgment proof,
e.g., if the hacker is a minor, or the hacker's identity is hidden from
detection using technology such as anonymous remailers or encryp-
tion. In these cases, the software owner cannot be made whole by
simply suing the hacker who intentionally performed the infringing
act.
The U.S. courts have yet to decide from a policy perspective
who should bear the risk and liability for mass patent infringement
over the Internet. The current patent law doctrine allows the courts
to follow one of two primary theories. The courts can either: (A)
hold the Internet-enabling entities' 9 liable for all the damage when
the software owner cannot be made whole due to judgment-proof de-
fendants; or (B) fimd that patent law shelters the Intemet-enabling
entities from massive liability, thereby avoiding any chilling effect
on the Internet while placing the risk of financial loss from Internet
hacking on the software manufactures and database creators. To
determine which of the two choices are likely to be adopted in U.S.
patent law, one must examine recently published copyright policy
discussions and federal copyright decisions due to the lack of patent
infringement case law involving the Internet environment.
that bulletin board were liable for direct and contributory infringement after unknown Internet
users uploaded unauthorized copies of video games to the bulletin board. Subsequently, other
Internet users downloaded the unauthorized video games, thereby creating additional infring-
ing copies. The defendants allegedly knew of and facilitated the infringing activity.).
19. "Interet-enabling entities" include Internet hardware manufacturers (such as com-
puter manufacturers and software developers), Internet service providers (companies that pro-
vide computer users access the Internet), Internet resource owners, and telecommunications
service providers. Copyright case law suggests it is more likely that Internet service providers
and similar entities will be subject to software patent infringement claims in the future than
Internet software and hardware manufacturers. See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1994). However, all Internet-enabling entities which create or provide Internet technologies to
the market are considered, herein, to render a complete picture of software patent liability on
the Internet.
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Concerning policy choice (A), a court may conclude that patent
infringement is a strict liability tort20 and hold the Internet-enabling
entities liable under theories similar to those applied for copyright
infringement in Sega Enteiprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA21 and Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena.22 Alternatively, the courts may decide to
hold the Intemet-enabling entities liable under a theory of induce-
ment or vicarious liability in a manner similar to that found in copy-
right law.23 Under policy choice (B), a court may choose to provide
Internet-enabling entities with the protection of contributory in-
fringement and require volition or a volitional act24 on the part of the
20. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974) (noting that patent
law forbids independent creation of the patented matter and needs no intent or knowledge of
infringement); Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1959)
(holding that infringement does not depend on the good faith or innocent mind-set of the in-
fringer); Metal Film Co. v. Melton Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 111 n.15 (noting that neither lack of
knowledge of the patent nor lack of intent to infringe is a defense for the issue of patent in-
fringement).
21. 857 F. Supp. at 686 (holding that electronic bulletin board operator was infringing
under both direct and contributory infringement due to a bulletin board user's uploading of
illegal copies of software to the bulletin board).
22. 839 F. Supp. at 1556 (finding that electronic bulletin board operator was liable for
the transfer of copied, digitized photographs through his bulletin board despite the operator's
lack of knowledge of the transfer).
23. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)
(providing the necessary equipment to infringe may constitute contributory infringement or
inducement); Demetriades v. Kaufman, 690 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that if one
encourages, requests, or promotes the infringement, one can be held liable under an induce-
ment theory of copyright law); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that vicarious liability can be found where: (1) the defendant has a right and
ability to control the acts of the infringer, and (2) the defendant receives a direct financial
benefit from the infringement; here, the defendant who coordinated and held a flea market and
was held vicariously liable where a flea market is similar to some Internet service providers
and on-line purchasing sites)).
24. For tort liability, one must have had either the prerequisite intent and/or committed
the wrongful act. In certain circumstances, one can justifiably be found liable for committing a
harmful act although the actor had no intent to do wrong (i.e., strict liability). In extreme cir-
cumstances, it may also be reasonable to hold a defendant liable for damages for simply having
had the requisite intent absent an accompanying bad act. However, it is intuitively improper to
hold someone liable when that person did not intend to committed a directly harmful act but
merely an act remotely related to the infringing activity. If it were possible for one to be held
liable for massive damages without directly committing an act and without intent or knowl-
edge, it may be more efficient to randomly, yet equally, assign liability to citizens and corpo-
rations and do away with lengthy trials. Even strict liability, which has no element of intent,
requires that the defendant performed some act or had a direct causation or link to the infring-
ing activity.
Patent infringement, a strict liability tort, does not require that the defendant have any in-
tent; however, the patent law does require that the defendant commit some "act" to contribute,
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Internet-enabling entities before finding patent infringement liability,
as was done via Religious Technology Centel- v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services and Sony Coip. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. in the copyright context.25
Both policy perspectives (A) and (B), above, have advantages
and disadvantages. It is therefore unclear which theory, or some
combination thereof, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) will adopt for patent infringement on the Internet. The
author believes the volitional requirement and contributory in-
fringement approach of choice (B) is more reasonable for U.S. pat-
ent law on the Internet. This approach spreads the risk of loss
among the many software vendors and avoids chilling effects on the
manufacture, operation, and use of Internet technology. Additional
benefits will be discussed herein.
Part I of this paper will introduce a "typical" hacker scenario to
illustrate the problem of software and database hacking on the Inter-
net, as well as provide a background for copyright infringement
theories as they relate to patent infringement on the Internet. It also
discusses the newly-utilized software patent claims, which could
cause software patent liability issues resulting from use of the Inter-
net. Part II examines the types of software and database copies typi-
cally encountered on the Internet and how these copies may result in
aid, induce, or further the infringement before being held liable. See cases cited supra note 20.
If the defendant committed no act that he could control or prevent, what infringement avoid-
ance incentive does assessing massive damages and injunctions serve? See Eastman Oil Well
Survey Co. v. Speny-Sun Well Surveying Co., 131 F.2d 884, 887 (5th Cir. 1944) (basing li-
ability on "what the defendant is doing" infringes or not); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safty Travel
Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding defendants personally liable for
acts of direct infringement) (emphasis added). "Act" may also include omission or failure to
act after one is given knowledge of infringement. Suppose one told an Internet entity that in-
fringing software was on his service and he chose to do nothing for two years? See also Black
& Decker (U.S.), Inc. v. Home Prod. Mktg., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (N.D. 111. 1996)
(noting that either acts or omissions accompanied by knowledge can result in direct infringe-
ment), reconsideration denied, 935 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D.IUl. 1996).
25. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368 (holding that "incidental copies" are not direct or
contributory infringement); see also, Marobie-FL, Inc. v. the National Association of Fire
Equipment Distributors, available in 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18764 (N.D. I1. Nov. 13, 1997)
(generally supports the rationale of Netcom); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (applying fair use and contributory infringement theories so that the act
of supplying the technology to enable illegal copying would not be hampered by massive li-
ability or injunction, especially where the technology provided has many other non-infringing
useful public purposes).
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patent infringement liability. Part III identifies technology, which
could enable users to infringe the software patent claims, discussed
in Part I.C., by creating electronic and magnetic software copies, as
discussed in Part II. Parts IV and V consider the U.S. patent law,
which could enable a court to adopt either policy perspective (A) or
(B); strict liability tort or liability only when the entity commits a
volitional act, respectively. Lastly, Part VI offers reasons why the
second theory, requiring a volitional act of infringement, is more
reasonable for U.S. patent law concerning the Internet.
A. A Common Hacker Scenario
A computer hacker illegally gains access to a computer program
available on an Internet page or network. The Internet page is
physically resident within the memory of a computer 26 located
somewhere in New York City, New York. The computer hacker
downloads the computer program to his home computer in San Fran-
cisco, California by clicking on an HTML menu item.27 The com-
puter in New York uses a specific Internet program28 and a specific
operating system 9 to begin the electronic transfer of the hacked
software. The New York site stores the requested hacked copy from
the computer's hard disk to dynamic random access memory
(DRAM) 30 within the computer using the computer's microproces-
sor. The microprocessor within the computer in New York copies
the program, bit-for-bit, from internal computer storage areas to an
external modem across conductive cabling3' or by using network ac-
26. Computers are publicly sold or manufactured by the following entities or under the
following brand names: Apple Computer ("Apple"), Compaq, Dell, Gateway 2000, Hewlett
Packard, IBM, Packard Bell, Sun Microsystems, Toshiba, etc.
27. IAN S. GRAHAM, HTML SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 1996) (noting HTML code can be cre-.
ated and maintained by using software provided by many different sources).
28. Servers are provided by the following manufacturers or brand names: Apache, Apple,
CERN, Microsoft, NCSA, Netscape, Novell, etc.
29. Examples of operating systems include: Apple's System 7.0, IBM OS/2, Microsoft
DOS, Pink, UNIX, VMS, Windows NT, Windows95, etc.
30. DRAM and like memory are manufactured and/or assembled into printed circuit
boards or SIMMs by such entities as Advanced Micro Devices ("AMD"), Cypress Semicon-
ductor, Fujitsu, Goldstar, Hitachi, Hyundai, IBM, Intel, Matsushita, Micron, Mitsubishi, Mo-
torola, NEC, Samsung, Seimens, Texas Instruments, Toshiba, etc.
31. Providers of computer and/or telecommunication cabling include Asante, Cabletron,
Cisco, and Farallon.
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cess hardware. 32 Before reaching the modem, intermediate copies
may be made using various glue hardware/logic 33 within the com-
puter located in New York. The modem creates copies using one or
more microcontrollers or digital signal processors (DSPs) 34 and
sends the hacked computer copy along the telephone lines where
hundreds or thousands of computers and routers will produce even
more copies.35 Before the modem even connects to the telephone
lines, potentially several Fortune 500 companies have contributed to
the creation of one or more infringing copies of the hacked soft-
ware.36
The hacker will receive a copy of the hacked program at his
California computer, using his modem or communications card, via
the communications network. The hacked software will have trav-
eled a path of interconnecting computer networks on the Internet,
and many illicit copies will have been created along the way.37 At
the hacker's computer in California, the software program is down-
loaded by more microcontrollers or DSPs to a hard disk where an-
other copy of the program is created. The hacker takes a floppy
disk38 and copies the hacked program onto the floppy disk. The
floppy disk is used to transfer the hacked software to yet another
computer. The floppy drive on this other computer copies the
hacked program to more random access memory (RAM). The
hacker executes the hacked software to see the hacked graphical user
32. Network access hardware is available from the following manufacturers or under the
following brand names: 3com, AMD, Cisco, Motorola, Megahertz, Xircom, etc.
33. Integrated circuit ("IC") components are made by many different manufactures and
will not necessarily interface directly with each other due to different timing constraints, proto-
cols, output and input terminal configurations, etc. When compatibility is an issue, "glue
logie" is placed between the ICs to render one compatible with the other. General computer
integrated circuit components are made by manufacturers such as AMD, Hewlett-Packard, Hi-
tachi, IBM, Intel, Motorola, NEC, Seimens, Texas Instruments, and Toshiba.
34. Microcontroller and/or DSP manufacturers include Hitachi, Lucent, Motorola, NEC,
and Texas Instruments.
35. The telecommunications infrastructure is massive and involves thousands of corpo-
rations, governmental entities, etc. Such involved corporate entities include MCI, Sprint,
AT&T, local service providers (e.g., Southwestern Bell), America On-Line, Prodigy, Northern
Telecom, IBM, Irdium, Motorola, PrimeCo, British Telecom, and Ericsson.
36. See discussion infra Part III.B-D and accompanying Figures.
37. See discussion infra Part III.A, III.E and accompanying Figures.
38. Floppy disks and like disks are made by 3M, iomega, Opus, Sony, TDK, BASF,
Scotch, Verbatim, etc.
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interface (GUI)39 on a computer monitor, resulting in the code being
loaded into the video RAM (VRAM) of the computer. The hacker
may even convert electronic copies in the RAM to a printer to obtain
a tangible copy of the hacked code.
The hacker then copies the hacked program onto an Internet
service site40 where thousands of users locate and download the
hacked program, each user then creates additional hacked copies.
The users download the hacked software at no cost, causing substan-
tial economic loss to the original program owner. In parallel with
this hacker, and in the same week, thousands of other computer
hackers perform similar computer hacking operations on other com-
puter programs or data structures, using similar hardware and serv-
ices. By the end of the week, millions of hacked copies of software
have been temporarily or permanently created around the globe so
that hundreds or thousands of corporations and individuals are po-
tentially exposed to some degree of intellectual property liability.41
If the original owner holds software patents, which exclude others
from making, using, or selling the hacked software, a question arises
as to who should be held liable for such infringing activities over the
Internet.
B. Use of Copyright to Remedy the Scenario's Hacking
The original program owner has registered copyrights covering
the computer instructions and computer code structure contained
within the hacked program.42 Relying on copyright protection, the
original owner files a claim against the hacker only to discover that
the hacker is sixteen years old and judgment-proof, or alternatively,
unidentifiable due to anonymous remailing43 or extensive encryp-
39. Graphical user interfaces (GUI) use a mouse, Windows, and a point-and-click envi-
ronment to improve the efficiency of human interface to the computer and software.
40. A few examples are America On-Line, Compuserve, Flash Net, and Prodigy.
41. See discussion infra Parts V, VI.
42. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983);
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Computer Assocs.
Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc.,
64 USLW 4059, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 315, 64 USLW 3465, 116 S. Ct. 561, 116 S. Ct. 39
(1996 and 1995); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Sega
Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), for the general law concerning copy-
right protection of software.
43. See ANDRE BACARD, THE COMPUTERPRIVACY HANDBOOK 65-68 (1995).
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tion.44 Attempting to make himself whole, the original software
owner files a claim against the several corporations involved in the
computer program's electronic trek from New York to California. 45
The original owner argues that the unauthorized copies made by one
or more of these corporations and/or individuals constitute copyright
infringements. Direct infringement occurred since the unauthorized
copies were "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" 46
directly with the aid of a device for more than a transitory duration.
Many of the copies made on the electronic trip from New York
to California existed for only a few microseconds while other copies
may be resident in some form of computer storage for years, raising
a wide range of copyright fixation issues. The original software
owner argues that many of these copies are "fixed" 47 under the
Copyright Act. To make sense of the fixation requirement in com-
puter contexts, a distinction is typically made between "memory" 48
and "storage" 49 within computer systems. For a decade or so, courts
44. See generally WILLIAM STALLINGS, PRACTICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR INTER-
NETWORKS (1996).
45. It will be shown in later sections that literally thousands of infringing copies can be
made on the trek from New York to California.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining copies as "material objects, other than phonore-
cords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which
the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid or a machine or device").
47. Id. (Defining fixed: "[a] work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' ... if a fixation of
the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.").
48. "Memory" has one or more of the following characteristics: (1) a high speed of op-
eration; (2) entirely electronic in operation; (3) coupled directly or in close proximity to the
main microprocessor of the computer (also referred to as the central processing unit (CPU));
(4) loses all data stored once power is removed; and (5) maintains data for only seconds at a
time even when continually powered due to functional state changes. Examples of "memory"
include: random access memory (RA), static random access memory (SRAM), fast static
random access memory (FSRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), buffers, caches,
queues, register files, video RAM (VRAM), computer screen displays, wire transmissions,
wireless transmissions, and optical fiber transmissions.
49. "Storage" has one or more of the following characteristics: (I) relatively slow in op-
eration when compared to other computer components; (2) at least partly mechanical and not
entirely electronic; (3) not coupled directly for access by the main microprocessor or central
processing unit (CPU) of the computer; (4) retains binary computer data long after power is
removed from the device; and (5) intended to maintain data for months or years at a time. Ex-
amples of "storage" devices include: floppy disks, hard disks, tape storage, magnetic drums,
read only memory (ROM) integrated circuits, CDs, read/write CDs, ferroelectric memory (such
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have held that in particular situations the use of "storage" in an im-
proper manner will lead to copyright infringement. 0 Therefore, the
original software owner will claim that the many "storage" copies
created on the way from New York to California constitute copyright
infringements and one or more of the equipment manufacturers,
owners, or operators of the "storage" devices should be held liable
for the damage as direct infringers5" or as contributory infringers5 2
In addition to finding liability for improper computer "storage"
copies, courts have recently held that copies in short-duration
"memory" or random access memory (RAM) are of sufficient fixa-
tion for purposes of copyright infringement.5 3 Memory copies on
as PZT devices), and printer paper. Storage may also include electrically erasable programma-
ble read only memory (EEPROM), EPROM, and flash memory, which border between
"storage" and "memory."
50. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d. Cir. 1982)
(stating that although ROM is utilitarian, the data it contains is fixed and subject to copyright
protection; copying of another's data to ROM constitutes copyright infringement); Stern
Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 nA (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that all portions
of the program, once stored in memory devices anywhere in the game are fixed in a tangible
medium within the meaning of the Copyright Act); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d. Cir. 1983) (explaining that fixation is satisfied through
the embodiment of the expression in the ROM devices); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (extending copyright protection to computer pro-
grams); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (imprinting a computer program on a silicon chip, which then allows the computer to
read the program and act upon its instructions, falls easily within copyright protection); West
Publ'g Co. v. On Point Solutions, Inc., available in 1994 WESTLAW 778426, at 2 (N.D.Ga.
Sept. 1, 1994) (enjoining the selling, distributing, and copying of unauthorized RAM, floppy
disk, and CD-ROM copies for purpose of copyright infringement); Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 1992 WL 139364, at *8 (2d Cir. 1992) (asserting that non-literal structures
of computer tape and computer disks were intended to be considered "fixed" for the purpose of
copyright); Works Fixed in a CD-ROM Format, 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(xix) (1998).
51. Direct infringement may be found when a plaintiff can read each element of his
claim onto the defendant's invention. See generally 5 CinsuM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT, § 16 (1997) (discussing nature of
direct infringement of patent claims).
52. Contributory infringement may be found if a defendant knowingly and materially
contributed to a direct infringer's wrongful act. Frequently, several companies will jointly
develop and produce a complex device or process, and different parties will contribute pieces
to the infringing invention. In this situation, even the noninfringing parties may be held liable
as a contributory to the direct infringement. See generally 5 CInSUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILrIY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT, § 17 (1997) (discussing na-
ture of contributory infringement of patent claims).
53. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that copyright infringement occurs when a computer program is transferred from a
permanent storage device to a computer's RAM without the owner's permission); Triad Sys.
Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that copy-
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computers servicing the Internet are more abundant than storage
copies, as will be discussed infia in Parts III and IV. Due to this re-
cent trend in copyright case law, more computer and communication
manufacturers, owners, and service providers may be subject to li-
ability for a single infringing transmission from New York to Cali-
formia.
In some circumstances, federal courts indicated, for public pol-
icy reasons, that it is not feasible or rational to expose computer
hardware manufacturers, computer owners, software providers, and
telecommunications service providers to massive copyright liability
for the automatic and unknowing copies created by a culpable third
party who inappropriately uses the Internet 4 While direct infringe-
ment has occurred due to the hackers' activity on the Internet, the
manufacturers, owners, service providers, etc., will likely be deemed
contributory infringers, and contributory infringement requires an
element of "knowledge" or "intent.1 55 It seems very unlikely that
ing a program in RAM constitutes infringement); Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v.
MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (concluding where a copyrighted pro-
gram is loaded into RAM and maintained there for minutes or longer, the RAM representation
of the program is sufficiently 'Tixed" to constitute a "copy" under the Copyright Act); Micro-
Spare, Inc. v. Anitype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Mass. 1984) (using a program inputted
into a computer constitutes a potential copyright violation); NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-Am.,
Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1995) (loading software into a computer constitutes the crea-
tion of a copy under the Copyright Act); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp.
1537, 1541 (D. Kansas 1995) (transferring a computer program from storage device to a com-
puter's RAM constitutes copy for purposes of copyright law); ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Al-
tech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1332 (N.D. Il. 1990) (copying a program from disk into the
computer's memory directly infringes the copyright).
54. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368 (finding neither access provider nor BBS operator
liable for direct infringement since access provider did not take any affirmative action that di-
rectly resulted in copying, other than installing and maintaining an electronic system whereby
software automatically forwarded and stored copies of messages). But see Playboy Enter., Inc.
v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding the defendant liable for direct
infringement although the defendant lacked intent and knowledge); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding direct copyright infringement by com-
puter bulletin board company and individual in control of bulletin board whereby video games
were uploaded to bulletin board by unknown users and subsequently downloaded by users to
make unauthorized copies, which copying was known and facilitated by defendants).
55. RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (analyzing the
machine owner's liability and machine manufacturer's liability under the rubric of contributory
infringement, not direct infringement). See also Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 683 (N.D.Cal. 1994)
(finding contributory infringement since defendant solicited the copying of infringing pro-
grams and therefore had knowledge); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
487 (1984) (attaching liability for contributory infringement where defendant "with knowledge
of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
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the Internet-enabling parties possessed sufficient knowledge or intent
in the above hacker hypothetical to warrant liability of any kind un-
der any contributory infringement or inducement theory. Moreover,
it seems equally likely that the lack of volition or act which has any
reasonable nexus to the infringing activity would result in many In-
ternet-enabling entities being absolved of any direct liability in a
manner similar to the Netcom case.56
Having registered copyrights for the hacked program, the origi-
nal software owner may pursue a theory of vicarious liability against
infringers under copyright law. Vicarious liability will hold the
manufacturers, owners, and service providers on the Internet liable
when they: (1) had the right and ability to control the infringer's
acts; and (2) received a direct financial benefit from the infringe-
ment.5 7 Once again, the companies in the hacker hypothetical 58 exert
little, if any, control over the hacker's conduct. There has been no
direct financial benefit gained by most, if any, of the Internet-
enabling entities through contract or through any other means by the
infringing activity.5 9 The only financial benefit these corporations
accrued was the initial sale of the device, sale of Internet software,
sale of a computer component, or a service arrangement provided
without any infringing software being present. This type of first sale
benefit has little nexus to the act of direct infringement. Thus, it will
be difficult for the original software owner to prove direct infringe-
ment, vicarious liability, or contributory infringement on the part of
another" (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 625
(N.D.Cal. 1993) (noting that "participation of the alleged contributory infringer must be
'substantial').
56. Netcomn, 907 F. Supp. 1361. See Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc.,
806 F.2d 1565, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding defendants personally liable for acts of direct
infr ngement) (emphasis added).
57. See Netcoin, 907 F. Supp. at 1375; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1963) for discussions of vicarious liability.
58. See supra Part I.A.
59. Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(finding no vicarious liability for trade show organizers who used fixed fees and thereby did
not derive any financial benefit from exhibitor's allegedly infringing musical performances);
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1376 (holding that defendants must show some control over the in-
fringing party's conduct and direct financial benefit from the infringing activities of its users in
order to be held liable under a vicarious liability theory).
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any of the above listed Intemet-enabling corporations when applying
copyright theories of Netcom.
In general, the potentially thousands of infringing copies made
on the information superhighway path from New York to California
constitute direct infringements of the copyrighted software only by
the hacker, so a remedy can only come from the hacker, absent con-
tributory infringement. This is because copyright law, under a Net-
corn rationale, has economically-justified liability barriers to protect
Internet hardware, software, and service providers in the modem
communication environment. These barriers are rooted in such
copyright doctrines as contributory infringement, fixation, fair use,
and vicarious liabilit as discussed in the case law previously cited.
These barriers to copyright infringement and general copyright law,
as it relates to the Internet and associated technology, have been the
primary focus of intellectual property attention in the legal commu-
nity.60 This focus may need to be shifted to another threat: software
60. Barry D. Weiss, Barbed Wires and Branding in Cyberspace: The Future of Copy-
right Protection, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 1996, at 397 (PLI Pats., Copy-
rights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 450, 1996); Henry H. Per-
ritt, Jr., Cyberliability, in LITIGATING LIBEL AND PRIVACY SuITS 1996, at 173 (PLI Pats.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 446, 1996); Rex S.
Heinke & Lincoln D. Bandlow, Roadblocks and Exit Ramps on the Information Superhighway,
in LITIGATING LIBEL AND PRIVACY SUITS 1996, at 203 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks,
and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 446, 1996); Sylvia Khatcherian, Liability on
the Internet, N.Y. ST. B.J., May-June 1996, at 34; Janice R. Walker, Protecting Cyberspace:
Copyright and the World Wide Web, FED. LAW., May 1996, at 42; Mark C. Morril & Sarah E.
Eaton, Protecting Copyrights On-Line: Copyright Liability for On-Line Service Providers, 8 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 2 (1996); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age,
75 OR. L. REV. 19 (1996); Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299
(1996); Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability on the Internet, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1996, at
417 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 437,
1996); Joseph V. Myers III, Note, Speaking Frankly About Copyright Infringement on Con-
puter Bulletin Boards: Lessons to be Learned From Frank Music, Netcom, and the White Pa-
per, 49 VAND. L. REV. 439 (1996); Ian C. Ballon & Heather D. Rafter, Computer Sojhvare
Protection, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION, at 81 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 431, 1996); Byron F. Marchant, O-
Line on the Internet: First Amendment and Intellectual Property Uncertainties in the On-Line
World, 39 How. L.J. 477 (1996); Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilities of System Operators on the In-
ternet, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1996); John Carmichael, Comment, In Support of the
White Paper: Why Online Service Providers Should Not Receive Immunity From Traditional
Notions of Vicarious and Contributory Liability for Copyright Infringement, 16 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 759 (1996); Andrea Sloan Pink, Comment, Copyright Infringement Post Isoquantic
Shift: Should Bulletin Board Services Be Liable?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 587 (1995); Edward A.
Cavazos & G. Chin Chao, System Operator Liability For A User's Copyright Infringement, 4
TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J 13 (1995); Kelly Tickle, Comment, The Vicarious Liability of Elec-
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and database patent infringement. Currently, this threat has not been
reduced by a Netcoin-type, liability-limiting decision and could re-
sult in significant liability for some Internet-enabling entities under
the additional patent theories of importation, exportation, vicarious
liability, direct infringement, and contributory infringement and/or
inducement.
An important issue is: should software patent law provide a
remedy for the original software owner against Internet-enabling en-
tities where public policy, visited under copyright law in Netcom and
Sony,61 has refused to do so? Currently, no case law suggests that
the courts will not follow a very broad reading of "strict liability"
and "infringing acts" to impose liability, even direct liability, on
some Internet-enabling entities under theories similar to Sega and
Frena.62 Well-settled patent doctrines, such as direct infringement,
contributory infringement, inducement, vicarious liability, infringe-
ment due to exportation, infringement due to importation, and the
like, in the context of massive patent infringement on the informa-
tion superhighway, could go either way.
As discussed in Parts II and Im, infra, of this article, a broad
patent law interpretation of direct infringement on the Internet by
virtue of making, importing, exporting, or using infringing copies on
the Internet should greatly concern Internet-enabling entities. How-
ever, if the courts exclude the possibility of direct infringement by
these entities, the more defendant-friendly doctrines of inducement,
vicarious liability, and contributory infringement should protect most
tronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin
Boards, 80 IOWA L. REV. 391 (1995); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Lav and Social Dialogue
on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board
Operators, 13 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995).
61. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-69 (holding that when defendant's system made
temporary copies of plaintiffs' works, not mean defendant caused the copying); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446-50 (1984) (finding that entities who merely
provide hardware, which is subsequently used by infringers to perform infringing acts, were
neither contributory infringers nor liable under the fair use doctrine).
62. See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1555 (finding that electronic bulletin board service op-
erator was liable for the transfer of copied, digitized photographs through his bulletin board
despite the operator's lack of knowledge of the transfer); Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 686 (direct and
contributory copyright infringement by computer bulletin board company and individual in
control of bulletin board was found when unauthorized copies of video games were made
when games were uploaded to bulletin board by unknown users and subsequently downloaded
by users to make additional copies, which copying was known and facilitated by defendants).
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of the Internet-enabling entities that have no knowledge, volition, or
nexus to the infringing act while simultaneously ensuring that the
Internet-enabling entities that are acting with knowledge and/or vo-
lition will pay the consequences for their culpable acts.
C. Enter the Software Patent
Recent CAFC case law and USPTO policy have validated new
styles of software patent claims that may have repercussions on the
Internet. The following sections carefully examine new software ar-
ticle of manufacture claims,63 software means-plus-function claims, 64
and data structure claims6 recently allowed by the USPTO. These
new software claims styles, in combination with the unsettled policy
of who should bear the risk of intellectual property damage on the
Internet, may cause some concern among Internet enabling entities.
1. The Software Article of Manufacture Claim
If copyright law does not provide an adequate remedy for the
hacking activity illustrated in Part I.A., supra, an owner of a valid
U.S. software patent may geek a remedy under a theory of patent in-
fringement. The software patent issued to the patent holder protects
new and novel algorithms or data structures developed for and used
within the original software, which have now been illegally copied
by the hacker.66
63. Software "article of manufacture claims" are claims covering a computer program or
data structure embodied in a computer-readable medium, such as a memory device. For exam-
ple, an article of manufacture claim could read on a Windows® 95 embodiment in a disk,
RAM, or CD.
64. Software "means-plus-function claims" are structural claims directed towards the
physical structure of a computer that contains the novel software for which a patent is sought.
65. "Data structure claims" are claims, independent of any physical element, that read on
the physical structure of data stored in memory. Data is arranged in a computer in some func-
tional manner so that the data is useful.
66. See In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that computer
programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as articles of manufacture and must be examined under 35
U.S.C. §§ 102-103). Beauregard bears no judicial precedence, but the case clearly indicates
the USPTO's willingness to accept article of manufacture claims for software inventions. See
also Guidelines for Examination of Computer-Related Inventions, 60 Fed. Reg. 28778 (1995)
(proposed June 2, 1995) (proposing PTO Examiner guidelines for evaluating the patentability
of computer-related inventions); Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 2106 (rev. July,
1996); In Re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that data structures designed
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For the purposes of this subsection, assume that the software
patent contains software article of manufacture claims. To infringe
these claims, one need only have used, sold, copied, imported, of-
fered for sale, or made the storage structure containing the software.
No computer is needed for infringement, and the software on the
storage structure arguably need not be executed for infringement.
Software article of manufacture claims are a relatively new addition
to software patent law.67 Thus, many practitioners may not be fa-
miliar with the form and purpose of this type of claim.
Initially, software patents contained: (1) method claims reciting
the process that occurred when the software was executed; and/or (2)
apparatus or structure claims which recited a computer structure
containing the novel software. Companies which exclusively pro-
duced and distributed software on floppy disks or CDs did not exe-
cute the software, and therefore, arguably, did not directly infringe
the method claims. Additionally, many software manufacturers do
not manufacture or distribute computers or computer hardware com-
ponents which infringe apparatus or structure claims. The software
article of manufacture claim developed over the years in an attempt
to render software manufacturers as direct infringers, rather than
mere contributory infringers.
Software article of manufacture claims first received wide noto-
riety and scrutiny in In re Beauregard.68 In Beauregard, the USPTO
Board of Appeals rejected a claim directed to a computer program
embodied on a computer readable medium, such as a floppy disk,
under the "printed matter doctrine." The "printed matter doctrine"
stands for the proposition that an invention primarily embodied on
printed matter (e.g., newspapers, paintings, books, advertisements,
photographs, etc.) should be protected under copyright law and not
patent law.69 The USPTO and the Federal Circuit held conflicting
to permit computer to run more efficiently "impart a physical organization on the information
stored in memory").
67. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (extending credibility to software
patent claims).
68. Id. at 1584.
69. See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (questioning the applicability
of the "printed matter rejection" to computer memory); In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding no functional relationship between the printed material to the sub-
strate, the USPTO did not extend "patentable weight to the content of the printed matter"). See
19981
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views concerning the printed matter doctrine for many years; the
USPTO refused to allow patent claims to issue if they read on matter
found on a printed page or in printed form. The USPTO clung to the
doctrine since the early 1970s to curtail an expected flood of soft-
ware patents, whereas the Federal Circuit generally disliked the doc-
trine when applied against software.
Beauregard appealed to the CAFC, citing adverse case law as-
sociated with the printed matter doctrine.70 While awaiting a deci-
sion, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Office conceded
that software claimed as being embodied on a computer readable
medium will be patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 71
Further, the Comissioner stated that these claims must be reviewed
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Finding no case or controversy,
since the claims now passed muster under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
CAFC reversed the USPTO Board of Appeals; and the patent was
again examined in the USPTO under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.
Subsequent to Beauregard, the USPTO issued new patent ex-
amining guidelines for software-related inventions, which briefly
discuss the software article of manufacture claim.72 In addition to
allowing some software article of manufacture claims, these newly
proposed guidelines for software inventions weaken or fully discard
also In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (reemphasizing to USPTO that printed
matter may well constitute structural limitations upon which patentability can be predicated),
70. See Lowiy, 32 F.3d at 1583 (noting that printed matter may well constitute structural
limitations upon which patentability can be predicated); In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396,
(C.C.P.A. 1969) (printed matter in an article of manufacture claim can be given patentable
weight); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (patentable novelty cannot be predi-
cated upon printing alone, but must reside in physical structure; the mere arrangement of
printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper does not constitute patentable subject-matter).
71. Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584.
72. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2106 (rev. July, 1996); Exani-
nation Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions (Discussion Draft), 51 PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 422, 428-429 (Jan. 25, 1996) (indicating that article of manufacture
claims will be allowed over 35 U.S.C. § 101 if they are: (I) limited to a specific computer
readable medium; or (2) related to a generic computer readable medium and recite specific
software, wherein the software or method performed by the software is novel and produces a
useful practical result). "When functional descriptive material [such as data structures or com-
puter programs] is recorded on some computer readable medium it becomes structurally and
functionally interrelated to the medium and will be statutory in most cases." Id. at 427.
While the Examination Guidelines Discussion Draft is not an absolute acceptance of
software article of manufacture claims as Beauregard may have suggested, it is a step in the
right direction.
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reliance on the printed matter exception to software patentability. 73
Therefore, these new USPTO software examination guidelines have
opened the door for continued software article of manufacture claim
allowances in the near future.
A consequence of article of manufacture claims being drafted to
include the manufacture of the software onto a floppy disk or CD is
that these claims are also arguably infringed by Internet software
creation or software transmission on any computer readable me-
dium.74 The Internet consists of billions of computer-readable ele-
ments, all of which provide a basis from which liability for in-
fringement of software article of manufacture claims is possible.
Further, these software article of manufacture claims may be in-
fringed by the mere existence or embodying of the software code on
some computer or telecommunications medium.75 Therefore, any
entity creating a copy of a program in RAM or any similar computer
readable medium has the potential of infringing the software article
of manufacture claims possessed by the original software owner.
Furthermore, a patent claim does not suffer from a fixation
limitation as does copyright protection. Even if an entity copies the
hacked software for one femto-second, 76 infringement is possible
under patent law given a properly drafted software article of manu-
facture claim. As will be shown herein, computers, modems, mem-
ory devices, buffers, state machines, telecommunications nodes,
73. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions (Discussion Draft), 51
Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 422 (Jan. 25, 1996). The Examination Guidelines Dis-
cussion Draft expressly states that abstract ideas, natural phenomenon, and laws of nature are
unpatentable subject matter, but neglects to address the printed matter doctrine, thereby seem-
ing to abandon this doctrine as it was applied to software patents.
74. Other readable media include: magnetic tape, optical disc, compact disc (CD), hard
disk, floppy disk, ferroelectric memory, electrically erasable programmable read only memory
(EEPROM), flash memory, EPROM, read only memory (ROM), static random access memory
(SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), ferromagnetic memory, optical storage,
charge coupled devices, smart cards, and similar type storage media.
75. The Beauregard-type claim is an article of manufacture claim or apparatus claim.
Merely having software that performs the same indicated steps will directly infringe this appa-
ratus claim; no processing steps or code execution is required for infringement. For example,
regarding hacked copies on the Interaet, these copies are "made" and "used" for Intemet elec-
tronic transmission and utilize hardware, software, and equipment owned by the service pro-
viders. The software patent holders will argue the hacker's actions constitute software patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(d), whereby illicit "making" or "using' of the software
comprises the infringing act. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(d) (1988).
76. One quadrillionth of a second, or lxlO"15 second.
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mainframes, and all other electronic devices function as high-speed
micro-factories. 77 It would not be difficult for these high-speed mi-
cro-factories to produce new and multiple copies of the hacked code
every microsecond, resulting in many thousands of infringing copies
every second. These electronic copies may exist for only a fraction
of a second and yet, with no fixation requirement in patent law, such
transitory copies may subject a legal entity to substantial liability.78
The above characteristics of the article of manufacture software
claim renders this claim style potentially problematic for Internet-
enabling entities.
In order to better understand the threat to the Internet enabling
entities, consider the following two examples of software article of
manufacture claims for a hypothetical piece of computer software
that, when executed, does the following: (1) sorts a list of items; (2)
searches the list of items; and (3) transmits a selected item from the
list.
The first style of manufacture claim follows:
1. A data provider stored on computer readable medium, the
data provider comprising:
a first plurality of computer instructions, which when
provided to a CPU, sorts a list of items;
a second plurality of computer instructions, which
when provided to a CPU, searches the list of items to
identify a selected item; and
a third plurality of computer instructions, which when
provided a CPU, transmits the selected item.
77. Currently electrical devices used for software execution and electronic routing oper-
ate at frequencies of 200MHz to 800MHz. This theoretically means that approximately 200-
800 million operations can occur in a single second when using just one of these devices.
78. Copyright law may provide a means to avoid the limitation of fixation as well.
When a program is transmitted over the Internet, the program is divided into segments. These
segments are packaged into "datagrams," and the datagrams are packed into a "frame" which
contains additional material to enable Internet transmissions. Thus, one may argue that an In-
teret transmission creates a derivative work which requires no fixation. Cf Mirage Editions,
Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Lewis Galoob Toys,
Inc. v. Nintendo of Amer., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) ("quasi fixation" discussed for
derivative works).
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The second style of article of manufacture claim is illustrated below:
2. A data provider stored on computer readable medium
wherein the data provider is executable by a central proc-
essing unit (CPU), the data provider, when executed by the
CPU, causes the CPU to comprise:
sort circuitry which provides a list of sorted items;
identification circuitry which identifies a selected item
in the list of sorted items; and
transmission circuitry which transmits the selected
item.79
These types of claims were designed to catch in a "direct in-
fringement net" all of the software manufacturers that produced ei-
ther disks or CDs containing infringing software for mass markets.
However, these claims go further than just catching the software
manufacturer; these claims are arguably infringed each time in-
fringing code is copied into RAM, CD, tape, disk, ROM, 80 or any
79. The author has seen many Beauregard-type claims using the words "when executed
by a central processing unit (CPU)," "computer readable medium," or similar language. Such
language should be used carefully for at least two reasons. First, the software may be commu-
nicated or purchased from the Internet in a compressed or encrypted form. This raises the issue
of whether encrypted or compressed files be presented to a computer for execution. One may
argue that a CPU cannot directly process compressed or encrypted files since they do not con-
tain directly usable computer instructions for the CPU. Second, patents issued from applica-
tions filed after June 8, 1995 will expire twenty years from the earliest effective filing date. By
2010, it would not be surprising to see "sneaker nef' purchasing (i.e., walking to the mall to
buy software) replaced by wireless, optical, or satellite purchasing and downloading of soft-
ware. Is optical light a "computer readable medium?" By avoiding these "when executed by a
CPU" and "computer readable medium" limitations, the patent may have a longer, useful life
and avoid hyper-technical infringement defenses.
80. One may ask why manufacturers worry about software infringement on ROM since it
cannot be written to with new copies. Article of manufacture claims cause problems for IC
manufacturers when with ROM since when an entity orders a product containing ROM, the
required software in the ROM is provided to the IC manufacturer. The IC manufacturer then
makes masks, or templates, which are used for laying out the pattern of the IC. The masks
contain the structures needed to "hardwire" the software in a fixed, physical manner onto the
substrate of the IC. In another form, generic ICs are first manufactured in bulk, and subse-
quent fuse blowing steps or one time programmable (OTP) methods are used to permanently
transfer the required code to the IC. In either form, the IC manufacturer is arguably a direct
infringer of the software article of manufacture claims even if that company does not own a
computer to execute the software. Furthermore, the mask maker may be a contributory in-
fringer. Companies that manufacture microcontrollers containing ROM or OTP memory must
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like computer readable medium for even nanosecond durations. As
one should see, this has a significant impact on Internet communica-
tions since the electronic transmission of software may be infringe-
ment of a software article of manufacture claim, in addition to any
asserted copyright infringement theories.
The USPTO admission in Beauregard, the weakening of the
printed matter exception, and the advent of USPTO acceptance of
software article of manufacture claims in their examination guide-
lines are significant. Without article of manufacture claims, soft-
ware inventions were claimed in structure/apparatus claims and
process claims. 81
Typically, "structure claims" include elements like CPUs,
printers, memory chips, display screens, counters, registers, ad-
dresses, and other electronic devices.' None of these electronic de-
vices exist within software or on common computer storage devices,
such as floppy disks and CDs. The "process claims" contain actions
which must be performed, such as printing, transmitting, sorting, en-
coding, communicating, or receiving. Under the hacker scenario,
these actions infringe if the software is executed by someone using a
CPU. Arguably, no infringement occurs when the actions are merely
routing, shipping, or manufacturing the code onto a computer read-
able medium. Therefore, the structure or apparatus claims and the
process claims do little to discourage a software manufacturer from
copying code onto a disk and shipping the disk to customers without
the CPU, printer, register, and without actually executing the code.
Despite the inherent advantage of these new software claims,
which allow U.S. patent protection for software executed on a per-
sonal computer, mainframe, or supercomputer, the following ques-
tion arose: to what extent can these software article of manufacture
claims create liability resulting from passive transmission on the In-
ternet via ownership, operation, control, censoring, and manufactur-
be cautious of software article of manufacture infringement. EPROM and EEPROM can be
written to more than once and therefore differ from ROM or OTP components.
81. "Structure/apparatus claims" read on a physical object, whereas "process claims"
read on a method for performing a process.
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ing of Internet resources which use, make, export, import, or other-
wise effects transmission of TCP/IP datagrams82 over the Internet?
2. The Software Means-Plus-Function Claim
In addition to the article of manufacture claim, the Alappat-
style means-plus-function claim 3 is likely to be found in many
newly issued software patents and in patents dating back into the
mid-1980s. The "means" form provided under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
para. 6, is a way of reciting structure, functionally. Therefore, a
computer that contains novel and patentable software can be claimed
as a means/structure for implementing the novel software algo-
rithm.84 The software means claims usually read on a computer that
contains the software, whereby some portion of the computer (not
just the disk or CD, as in Beauregard) is needed to show infringe-
ment.
An example of the Alappat means-plus-function claim directed
to the same hypothetical example used above for the article of manu-
facture claim is:
3. A data provider comprising:
means for sorting a list of elements to form a sorted list;
means for searching for a selected item in the sorted list; and
means for transmitting the selected item to another location.
In the case In re Alappat, the CAFC held that claims similar to
the claim listed above create "a new machine, because a general
purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer
once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to
instructions from program software."8 5 Under this theory, if the pat-
ents owned by the original software owner contain novel algorithms
claimed in a means-plus-function apparatus form, then every mo-
dem, memory chip, computer, etc., that copies the software into
82. When transferring data or software on the Internet over telecommunications facili-
ties, the data and/or software is broken into one or more segments and packaged into TCP/IP
datagrams for transmission. The Internet packaging includes the packet of data and a header.
83. See supra note 64.
84. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (CAFC 1994) (en banc).
85. Id. at 1545; see also In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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RAM or a like computer readable medium arguably infringes the
claim by creating a "new machine." However, it can be argued that
any claim drafted in a means-plus-function format should be read as
a "new machine" or "new computer" under Alappat and not simply
as a memory device storing novel computer code. Alappat mentions
article of manufacture claims in passing 6 and seems to disapprove of
any interpretation of means-plus-function claims as a software article
of manufacture claim.
The Court in Alappat stated, "[a] patent can be awarded to one
who 'invents or discovers' something within the enumerated classes
of subject matter - 'process,' 'machine,' 'manufacture,'
'composition of matter.' These terms may not be read in a strict lit-
eral sense entirely divorced from the context of the patent law."87
The Court further stated that with respect to article of manu-
facture claims,
if a claim to a compact disc or piano roll containing a newly
discovered song were regarded as a 'manufacture' and within
§ 101 simply because of the specific physical structure of the
compact disc, the 'practical effect' would be the granting of a
patent for a discovery in music.88
Therefore, there is room for one to argue that Alappat means-
plus-function claims should not be read as broadly as an article of
manufacture claim, but should be limited to a "new machine" as per
the holding of Alappat. This interpretation of the claim may itself
create some unique problems on the Internet.
If the software means-plus-function claim is not limited to a
new machine and can be extended to the "new article of manufac-
ture," then the software means-plus-function claim may be infringed
anywhere and in any manner that the Beauregard article on manu-
facture claims are infringed. However, if the software means-plus-
function claim is limited to a "new machine," then two possible sce-
narios exist.
86. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541-1543, 1552-1553.
87. Id. at 1553. Alappat suggests that simply providing an article of manufacture claim
is not enough. One must look to all other judicially created doctrines of patent law and 35
U.S.C. § 101 case law to determine patentability of an article of manufacture in the software
technological area.
88. Id. at 1554.
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In the first scenario, the simple presence of the software on a
"machine" constitutes an infringing act regardless of whether the
software is executed or not.89 The software's presence within a
memory qualifies as a "new machine" without needing to be exe-
cuted. Thus, even code temporarily residing in memory during its
travel over the information superhighway, where the memory can be
linked to a CPU, infringes a valid software patent.
However, in the second scenario, the software may need to be
executed on the machine before infringement of software means-
plus-function claims occurs.90 In this case, passive transmission or
routing of a software program as data on the information superhigh-
way may not be enough for infringement of Alappat claims.
Therefore, while the Alappat claims may be of interest to Inter-
net enabling entities, the Alappat means-plus-function software
claims may be more narrowly applicable than the Beauregard article
of manufacture claims for software routed or communicated, via the
Internet. This narrower application is due to the fact that Alappat
means-plus-function claims usually contain "active" functional
limitations under the sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.91
The hacked software communicated over the Internet is typi-
cally not executed to perform the functions recited in the Alappat
claims when being routed on the Internet. Rather, in many of the
routing computers and memory devices on the Internet, the ability to
89. In re Certain Surveying Devices, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 900 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
1981) (holding that although mere capability does not constitute infringement, "reasonable
capability to infringe" constitutes infringement).
90. Hap Corp. v. Heyman Mfg. Co., 311 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1962) (noting that it is not
what the infringing device might have done, but it is what the device was intended to do or
actually did); Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1525 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(awarding damages only for those devices found to actually infringe and not for those devices
merely capable of infringement); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Klimisch-Repro, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 586
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that infringement cannot be established by what the device might do,
but infringement must be established on what the device actually did).
91. An "active" functional limitation differs from a "passive" functional limitation. An
active functional limitation is one that states, for example, "code for performing X." This
statement in a claim implies that in order to infringe, the code must be performing X or capable
of performing X, or else there is no infringement. A "passive" functional limitation is one that
states "code which is capable of doing X," "code which is adapted to do X," or "code which,
when provided to a compatible CPU, does X." These passive limitations are arguably in-
fringed if the code is merely capable of eventually performing X, and need not be currently
executing X.
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execute the software to perform the functions recited for the
"means" in the claims may not be possible.92 Since every element of
a claim must be infringed to result in liability, if the device or serv-
ice through which the code is passed does not execute the code to
perform the "function" portion of the means-plus-function claim,
there may be no infringement. 93
Some cases state that it is not what the "machine" 94 actually
does, but what the machine is capable of doing that triggers in-
fringement. 95 The other line of cases hold the opposite view
92. Routing computers and memory devices on the Internet may be unable to execute the
software commands since the file may be: (1) encrypted and not directly executable; (2) com-
pressed and not directly executable; or (3) packaged in a protocol-layered manner, packaged
into frames, or formed into data packets (e.g., TCP/IP datagrams) for communications over the
Internet and are therefore not directly executable by any CPU. In addition, there may be hard-
ware compatibility issues. If the hacked code is written to execute on a Pentium TM' processor,
then the hacked file which is transferred via a UNIX Sun workstation, which cannot execute
Pentium Tm code, cannot be executed on the UNIX system. Likewise, the router communicat-
ing the hacked software on the Internet may be used solely for routing purposes and not
equipped with the physical memory-to-CPU connections to execute the code in any manner.
93. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that where a
claim does not read an accused device exactly, there can be no literal infringement of the
claim); Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (noting that literal infringement requires every element of the patent claim be met);
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ((1) the
doctrine of equivalents may not be used to enlarge a claim; infringement requires that every
limitation of a claim must be met by at least an equivalent substitute in the accused product or
process; (2) legal equivalency of a substitute is established by the knowledge in the art at the
time the patent is issued; and (3) the substitute must perform essentially the same function as
the element which it replaces so that overall the accused product or process and the claimed
invention can be said to operate by substantially the same means to achieve the same or sub-
stantially the same result), rev'd sub nom. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (adhering to doctrine of equivalents, but reversing and remanding on
federal court's failure to consider all requirements as related to prosecution history estoppel);
Pennwat Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that
equivalents must by found on an element-by-element basis or a limitation-by-limitations basis
within the claims; if limitation is missing, then no equivalents); Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("a claim is not infringed unless every element
thereof is met in the accused device, either literally or by an equivalent"); Texas Instruments,
Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("It is now settled law
that each element of a claim is material and essential and, in order to find infringement, the
patent owner must show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the ac-
cused device.").
94. The "means" of the Alappat means-plus-function claim creates a new "machine."
95. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co. v. Ruth, 87 F.2d 35, 38 (10th Cir. 1936) (reasoning that if
devices were designed so they could operated normally in an infringing way, immaterial that
some customers chose not to operate them in that manner); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Gid-
dings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding infringement even if the device was
used in a noninfringing manner since the device could also be used in an infringing manner).
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whereby even if a machine can carry out a claimed function but does
not actually perform the claimed function, then the machine does not
infringe the claim.96 In any event, regardless of possible problems
associated with asserting the Alappat claims as related to Internet
transmission infringement, currently the Alappat means-plus-
function claim is more commonly used in U.S. patents than the
Beauregard article of manufacture claim. Thus, Internet-enabling
entities should not ignore Alappat claims.
3. The Data Structure Claim
Another software claim style which could be infringed when
hacked software routes along the information superhighway is the
software data structure claim.97 While the contents, or the data itself,
cannot be patented, the arrangement or physical/organized memory
structure used to store the data may be claimed.98 Furthermore, the
USPTO could not conveniently ignore printed matter or data struc-
ture limitations in a claim when these types of limitations are present
in a claim.99 The court in In re Lowry extended the "new machine"
holding from Alappat to data structures by holding that a new data
structure transferred to a computer creates a "new machine." 100
However, the Lowiy claim was packed with structural limitations
such as "memory" and may not have pushed the data structure claim
style to a limit.101
96. See cases cite supra note 90.
97. See supra note 65.
98. In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding data structure as patent-
able under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 since the structure recited was seen as specific electronic
structural elements in a computer memory and data structure not analogous to printed matter).
99. Id. at 1582.
100. Id. at 1583.
101. The Lowry claim was recited as follows:
1. A memory for storing data for access by an application program being exe-
cuted on a data processing system, comprising: a data structure stored in said
memory, said data structure including information resident in a database used
by said application program and including:
a plurality of attribute data objects stored in said memory, each of said
attribute data objects containing different information from said data-
base;
a single holder attribute data object for each of said attribute data ob-
jects, each of said holder attribute data objects being one of said plurality
of attribute data objects, a being-held relationship existing between each
attribute data object and its holder attribute data object, and each of said
1998]
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Suppose one or more of the claims in the software owner's
software patents recites a data structure claim. Unlike the Alappat
means-plus-function claim, the Lowy-type data structure claim is
infringed without requiring specific use, processing steps, or com-
puter execution involving the data structure. 102 An infringing data
structure, which is potentially being transferred from New York to
California in a copied database portion of the hacked software, is re-
created into electrical or magnetic structures all along the informa-
tion superhighway route or is put into infringing use by the Internet.
In a manner similar to the hacked software covered by the Beaure-
gard claims, the original software owner believes that the copies of
the hacked database portion exposes many copying parties to liabil-
ity.
It should be noted that while Lowiy held that a data structure
claim could be found patentable under certain circumstances, ab-
stract recitations to "data structure" as the only structural limitation
within the claim may not render the claim patentable under 35
attribute data objects having a being-held relationship with only a single
other attribute data object, thereby establishing a hierarchy of said plu-
rality of attribute data objects;
a referent attribute data object for at least one of said attribute data ob-
jects, said referent attribute data object being nonhierarchically related to
a holder attribute data object for the same at least one of said attribute
data objects and also being one of said plurality of attribute data objects,
attribute data objects for which there exist only holder attribute data ob-
jects being called element data objects, and attribute data objects for
which there also exist referent attribute data objects being called relation
data objects; and
an apex data object stored in said memory and having no being-held re-
lationship with any of said attribute data objects, however, at least one of
said attribute data objects having a being-held relationship with said
apex data object.
Id. at 1581. Note that the term "memory" in a claim may help overcome 35 U.S.C. § 101 re-
jections. The word "memory" may have done so in Lowry, and "memory" avoided a 35
U.S.C. § 101 rejection in In re Warmerdam. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding that the dependent claim 5 was patentable subject matter while the base claim 1 was
unpatentable subject matter, and the only structural addition added to claim I by claim 5 was
"memory").
102. In this respect, Lowy-type claims are more like Beauregard-type claims where mere
creation, usage, or existence of the object under a defendant's control may incur liability.
However, Lowry-type claims recite data structure and not software code embodied on a com-
puter readable medium.
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U.S.C. § 101.103 In In re Warmerdam, claim 1104 was found to con-
tain unpatentable subject matter, under to 35 U.S.C. § 101. The de-
pendent claim 5105 was found to contain patentable subject matter,
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101, since claim 5 identified "memory" as
the only relevant structural limitation in addition to referencing
claim 1. However, Warmerdam's claim 6,106 which recited "data
structure" as the only relevant limitation in addition to referencing
claim 1, was found to be unpatentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
The lesson learned from the combination of Warmerdam and
Lowiy is that the CAFC will probably view the term "memory" as a
material limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 101 which renders the claims
as patentable subject matter, whereas a recitation to simply a "data
structure" may be ideologically abstract and interpreted in a non-
structural manner thereby rejectable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. How-
ever, the need for a limitation such as "memory" in a data structure
claim seems hardly likely to render this claim-style less suited for
Internet infringement in the future.
In any event, data structure claims will now be found to be pat-
entable in many circumstances. The communication of hacked data
structures through the Internet could pose liability concerns for In-
ternet-enabling entities in addition to the transmission of executable
software as discussed above with respect to Alappat and Beauregard.
103. See Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1358 (finding that a claim containing "memory" was
patentable over 35 U.S.C. § 101, whereas a claim reciting "data structure" was not patentable
over 35 U.S.C. § 101).
104. Claim 1 of Warmerdam:
1. A method for generating a data structure which represents the shape of physical ob-
ject in a position and/or motion control machine as a hierarchy of bubbles,
comprising the steps of: first locating the medial axis of the object and then
creating a hierarchy of bubbles on the medial axis.
Id. at 1357.
105. Claim 5 of Warmerdam: 5. A machine having a memory which contains data repre-
senting a bubble hierarchy generated by the method of any of Claims 1 through 4. Id. at 1358.
106. Claim 6 of Warnerdam: 6. A data structure generated by the method of any of
Claims 1 through 4. Id.
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II. THE TYPES OF ELECTRONIC AND MAGNETIC COPIES ROUTINELY
CREATED ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY - THE TECHNICAL
REASON FOR CONCERN
Internet services, Internet software, computer hardware, and
telecommunication systems are capable of creating many different
types of "memory" and "storage" copies.'0 7 Some of these copies
may easily result in either direct or contributory patent infringement
liability given the three styles of claims discussed above. Other
copies will be limited to contributory infringement theories, while
still other copies will be incapable of resulting in any patent liability
under any circumstances. In order to make a proper determination
of infringement, jurisdiction, who is a proper defendant to sue, etc.,
the types of copies created on the information superhighway and
where they are created must be understood.
A. The Slavish Total Copy
One type of copy which is made over the information super-
highway is the "slavish total copy." The author defines a slavish
total copy as a 100% total reproduction of the claimed software or
claimed data structure at any one point in time within a single struc-
ture, either produced by one legal entity or under the control of one
legal entity. For example, a posting of an infringing program on
America On-Line would result in at least one 100% total copy being
made onto the resources provided or controlled by America On-Line.
A copy made onto a computer hard disk is usually a 100% total copy
of the software which can later be executed. A tape backup contains
a 100% total copy of the 100% software copy resident on the hard
disk. A floppy disk can contain a 100% copy. A computer may
contain enough RAM to store the entire 100% copy from hard disk
into RAM. For short patented software code, one TCP/IP datagram
on the Internet may be a 100% slavish total copy. Typically, when a
hacker copies code off of the Internet, a slavish total 100% copy
must be made somewhere in some memory since the receiving com-
puter must have access or control over a 100% copy in order to ren-
der the software completely functional.
107. See supra Part I.B. for a discussion of "memory" as compared to "storage."
1998] SOFTWARE PA TENT JNFRiNGEMENT
The slavish total copy has a significant impact in the realm of
patent law. First, for direct infringement, all elements of the claimed
invention be made, used, sold, offered for sale, or imported.10 8 Di-
rect or literal infringement of a U.S. software patent can be easily
shown if a slavish total copy is found anywhere on the information
superhighway within the United States. The question remains,
"Who is responsible for the damages associated with the direct in-
fringement?" Is the hacker, the manufacturer of the hardware, the
owner of the hardware, the Internet service provider, and/or the tele-
communication company liable for the damage? Second, contribu-
tory infringement of a defendant cannot be found absent the finding
of direct infringement in some form. 09 Therefore, if there is no di-
rect infringement, all contributory infringement claims will fail.
Furthermore, favorable jurisdiction may very well depend upon
where the direct infringement occurred.110
In summary, parties should always be quick to find slavish total
copies on the information superhighway since their presence, or lack
thereof, will significantly impact subsequent legal analysis and strat-
egy.
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961) (noting that the combination patent covers only the totality of the
elements in the claim and not each element, separately viewed, within the patent grant); Inter-
dent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 552 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (explaining that omission of a
claimed element from a combination patented avoids infringement); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin
Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (indicating that infringement of a
claimed combination requires the presence in an accused structure of each claimed element, or
its equivalent).
109. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 876 & n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that absent direct infringement of patent claims, there cannot be con-
tributory infringement or inducement of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271); Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 483 (1964) ("if there is no direct infringe-
ment of a patent there can be no contributory infringement"); Wells Mfg. Corp. v. Littelfuse,
Inc., 547 F.2d 346, 350 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976) ("contributory infringement is defined in terms of
direct infringement").
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S.
222, 225 (1957) (noting the subject matter jurisdiction of district courts over patent and copy-
right infringement actions over defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation); Art
Leather Mfg. Co. v. Albumx Corp., 888 F. Supp. 565, 566 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (finding no juris-
diction where the accused infringer had no business connection with the forum and no in-
fringing activity was performed in the forum); Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Sci-
ences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (requiring that both sale and infringing
activities occur to support subject matter jurisdiction).
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B. The Time Serial Copy
A "time serial copy" is a copy that is formed in one device ei-
ther manufactured or under the control of one legal entity. However,
the entire claimed invention is not present in the device at any one
overlapping point in time.' This type of copy is especially impor-
tant if the serial device is sending data out of the United States in an
exportation manner. The time serial copy is best discussed with re-
spect to Fig. 1:
TIME MEMORY ELEMENT
1B
2 C A
3 D B
4Ec
FIG. 1
Many hardware and software operations on the information su-
perhighway and within modem computer systems result in informa-
tion being stored in a time serial manner as illustrated in Fig. 1.
With respect to Fig. 1, suppose a software article of manufacture
claim recites a computer program or a data structure having five
pieces A, B, C, D, and E, all of which are recited in the software
111. For example, if time period A ran from 0 to 10 seconds, time period B ran from 3 to
13 seconds, and time period C ran from 6 to 16 seconds; then A, B, and C would be overlap-
ping time periods, between time 6 to 10 seconds, since A, B, and C ran concurrently.
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claim.112 The memory device illustrated in Fig. 1 receives and cop-
ies element A into memory in a first time period 1. When storing A,
the memory device may either have no room for both B and A or be
operating at a speed that is so fast that A is provided as output and
erased from the device before B arrives at the input of the memory
device. In any event, A is transmitted as output signals and erased
from the memory before a time 2, and B enters the memory device
and is stored in the memory device in the time 2.113 In a time period
3, following time period 2, B is erased after proper output transmis-
sion and C enters the memory device and is copied. By the end of
time period 5, the memory device has copied the entire program into
RAM in a time sequence of A, then B, then C, then D, and finally E.
However, none of A through E were resident in the memory during
an overlapping time period and all of A-E were never resident in the
memory at one time.
Time serial copies are very common on the information super-
highway and within modem computer systems. Time serial copies
are made through telecommunications switching nodes, through mo-
dems, on printer spooling systems, through the pipeline(s) of a com-
puter CPU, through a satellite link, in buffers of a CPU, through pe-
ripherals that feed a hard disk, over Ethernet lines, in some caches,
etc. Many computer and telecommunications memory devices can
be viewed as high-speed, time serial manufacturing lines where the
entire patented program or data structure is created/copied in se-
quential incremental pieces, and an entire copy of the hacked soft-
ware is never stored in the device at any one time. For a time serial
copy, a 100% total copy of the program may be serially inputted,
copied, outputted, and erased within a mere fraction of a second.
Time serial copies may be direct infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) and will also expose some entities to contributory
infringement claims.114
112. A, B, C, D, and E may each be data bytes, packets of data bytes, individual bits, sub-
routines of a software program, data elements in a data structure, or similar items.
113. Depending upon the type of device, Times 1-5 of Fig. 1 may be separated by nano-
seconds or several hours.
114. See discussion of this patent law, infra Part IV.C.
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C. The Partial Copy
A partial copy is when the entire software program or data
structure is never copied at one point in time like a slavish total
copy, nor is a total copy automatically made in a time serial manner
over a specified period of time as in the case of a time serial copy.
In order to illustrate partial copies, Fig. 2 is provided:
Time Device Total Copy
I FA[- -ABCDEF'
2 [E] -d- [-ABCDEF'
3 P-D-- N -ABCDEF'
FIG. 2
Assume that a patent holder has a claim on an algorithm having
six parts, A through F as illustrated, in main memory in Fig. 2. For
the circuitry of Fig. 2, a slavish total copy is provided on a hard disk
(not illustrated in Fig. 2). The CPU within the computer, which has
access to the hard disk, contains two levels of cache"'. Fig. 2 illus-
trates one of these two cache levels labeled as "DEVICE"
(hereinafter "device").
The cache only stores parts of the program as needed by the
CPU and may never, even if left running for several years, copy all
parts A through F of the program - unlike the time serial copy and
the slavish total copy which will eventually copy the entire program
when given enough time and/or memory space. The partial copy
will rarely be a slavish total copy or a time serial copy unless com-
bined with some other device, either manufactured by another entity
115. Cache memory is a special, fast memory containing active segments of computer
programs so that the total execution time of the program is reduced.
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or under the control of another entity. Therefore, unlike a time serial
copy or a slavish total copy, the likelihood of being a direct infringer
of a software claim when responsible for making a partial copy is
substantially reduced.
However, if the patent holder has a valid patent claim reciting
only the routine D, the use in Fig. 2 is direct infringement since the
device makes a slavish total copy of D in Time 3.116 Furthermore, if
the patent holder has a claim that includes only A, C, and D, the
functioning of the device in Fig. 2 creates a time serial copy as
shown by the dashed line in Fig. 2. Therefore, a partial copy, as il-
lustrated in the device in Fig. 2 can result in later creation of a total
copy (unlikely) or a time serial copy (more likely) depending upon
the scope of the issued U.S. software claims. The probability that a
device, which usually makes partial copies, will eventually make a
time serial copy or a slavish total copy increases as the storage ca-
pacity of the device increases and as the time of use of the device in-
creases. Some examples of devices which are likely to make partial
copies are the cache of a CPU, the CPU pre-fetch buffer, and com-
puter RAM paging from a hard disk. Also, routers and switching
nodes on the Internet are designed to transmit from a transmitting
point to a receiving point along many different paths whereby each
path may never be presented with the entire program or data struc-
ture but may only be given pieces of the program or data structure.
In these cases, many communication paths on the Internet will create
only a partial copy.
D. The Selective Partial Copy
A subset of the partial copy is the "selective partial copy." A
selective partial copy, unlike the partial copy, will never be capable
of making a total copy regardless of its storage capacity, volume
limitation, or its time of access to an infringing 100% total copy.
The selective partial copy is best explained referencing Fig. 3:
116. Software claims may be directed to one million lines of code, a few kilobytes of
code, or a single computer instruction or opeode. Some very small memory devices, or even a
single TCP/IP datagram, may create either a slavish total copy or result in a time serial copy
when the claimed invention is a small piece of code or single instruction.
19981
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Time Device Total Copy
1 Ia2 ala2a3bl b2 b3cl c2 c3
2 0-1~ al a2 0 bl b2 b3 cl c2 c3
[3I0I1 al a2 0 bl b2 b3 cI c2 c3
FIGURE 3
In Fig. 3, assume a patent assignee has a patent on a software
program which has three subroutines A, B, and C. The patent claims
all of A, B, and C in the independent claim of the patent. Each rou-
tine A, B, and C contains three types of information. Information
with a "1," such as "al," "bl," and "cl," are branch instructions to
be executed by a CPU; information with a "2," such as "a2," "b2,"
and "c2," are data elements; information with a "3," such as "a3,"
"b3," and "c3," are all other computer instructions other than branch
instructions.
In computer systems, some devices are functionally designed to
only copy or store certain types of information from a computer pro-
gram or a data structure to satisfy a particular purpose. Video RAM
(VRAM) copies only graphics information from the executing pro-
gram; a branch cache stores only the branch instruction elements al,
bl, and cl in some predetermined form; a data cache (D-cache) will
store only the data items a2, b2, and c2 as illustrated in Fig. 3; an in-
struction cache (I-cache) will store only instructions a3, b3, and c3;
and a sound card will process only sound data from the executing
program. Even if the entire program is executed or accessed by a
CPU or computer, these special purpose devices are capable only of
copying certain segments of each element A, B, and C of the
claimed device. Therefore, unlike a partial copy which can create an
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infringing total copy or a time serial copy, given sufficient storage
space and time of exposure to the infringing program, the selective
copy will never do so. The devices which make selective partial
copies will probably never make copies which result in direct in-
fringement since selective partial copies must be coupled with other
devices in order to use the entire claimed subroutines A, B, and C.
Thus, the creator of a partial copy is most likely only liable under a
contributory infringement theory.
A subset of a selective partial copy is the "random partial
copy." In many cases, a device makes a copy of an object due to
sheer chance. In some cases, there is no apparent algorithm or crite-
rion which determines what device is to copy the infringing code.
Resources may be shared on a round-robin basis or randomized
schedule; lightning may strike a telephone line, destroying a TCP/IP
datagram which must subsequently be retransmitted through an oth-
erwise non-infringing computer. Under such circumstances, the data
did not designedly arrive at that particular device. Rather by chance,
that particular device created the infringing copy due to an unpre-
dictable event.'17
E. The Repetitive/Redundant Copy
Once a device makes a copy, that device may erase that copy
and make the same copy again at a later time for various functional
reasons. For example, when two router nodes of an Internet com-
munication are transmitting a data packet (i.e., datagram) of hacked
software using the TCP/IP protocol, an error may occur in transmis-
sion. This error may be due to noise in the communications link.
This noise may destroy the entire, or a significant portion, of the
datagram; and error detection and correction may not be possible.
Since the datagram cannot be recovered, the whole packet is re-sent,
creating a second infringing copy through the Internet due to the er-
ror.
Another example of repetitive copying involves CPU caching.
Once a piece of software code or data is cached in a CPU, it may be
117. Both the Fiber Distribution Data Interface (FDDI) system and TCP/IP can compen-
sate if an unforeseen error or uncontrollable event interrupts the datastream by making copies
of the packet to other devices.
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erased over time by more current information. After erasure, the
same previously-erased data or program portions may be recopied
again into the same device at a later time for a new use.
In yet another example, redundant or repetitive copies may be
created to ensure the long-term integrity of the data stored. To un-
derstand this concept, one need only look to a common, one-
transistor DRAM memory cell illustrated in Fig. 4:
Bit Line
Transistor ]-
Word
Capacitor Line
Ground
FIGURE 4
A single DRAM cell which stores one bit'18 of information is
illustrated in Fig. 4. A modem DRAM integrated circuit (IC) manu-
factured today will contain either sixteen million of the above cells
or sixty-four million of the above cells, plus all of the control and
sensing logic to read, write, and maintain data values in these mil-
lions of DRAM cells.
The DRAM cell of Fig. 4 is programmed with either a logical
one (a voltage above ground, say 2.5 volts by way of example) or a
logical zero (a ground voltage, which is 0 volts). Suppose that the
DRAM cell of Fig. 4 will contain a logical one value. To program
the DRAM cell of Fig. 4 to a logical one state, the bit line of Fig. 4
is set to a logical one, or 2.5 volts; and the word line is also acti-
vated so that the transistor is turned on. Since the transistor is turned
118. The bit is either a logical one (high voltage) or a logical zero (low voltage) state.
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on, the 2.5 volts on the bit line can access the capacitor through the
transistor and charge the capacitor to a stored voltage of roughly 2.5
volts. After the capacitor is charged, the transistor is turned off (by
deactivating the word line). When the word line is deactivated, the
capacitor is effectively isolated from the external environment by the
disabled transistor and left to retain the charge of a logical one.
However, once the capacitor of Fig. 4 is isolated with the logi-
cal one charge in place, the capacitor will begin to "leak" the stored
charge over time. A voltage on the capacitor that was once pro-
grammed to 2.5 volts will dissipate to 2.2 volts, then 1.9 volts, and
then 1.5 volts, whereby the voltage will eventually degrade down to
zero volts absent some sort of electrical intervention. In order to en-
sure long term retention of the data in an error-free condition, the
control circuitry of the DRAM "refreshes" the DRAM cell many
times per second. In order to refresh the DRAM data, the electrical
values in the DRAM cells are read from each cell within the DRAM
device (creating a time serial copy), using detection circuitry, and
then re-written to the DRAM cells (creating another copy, possibly a
slavish total copy at every refresh cycle) to the 2.5 volt level. Thus,
the capacitor voltage on a DRAM cell over time, when programmed
to a logical one state, looks like:
resh Refresh Refresh
FIGURE 5
each refresh, a new copy of the program
y one of these copies can raise issues,
[ity and jurisdiction. However, redun-
,5,) T
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dant and repetitive copies are more academic than of practical sig-
nificance since only one copy is needed to result in liability. Mas-
sive amounts of illegal copying by an entity may make that entity
appear very culpable to those unfamiliar with the technology. Such
illicit copying will affect whom the plaintiff can file a lawsuit
against, the appropriate jurisdiction for filing the claim, and the
cause of action asserted in the claim - direct or contributory in-
fringement, or inducement of infringement.
However, the number of unauthorized copies created does not
affect the economic damages since the number or frequency of cop-
ies has no real bearing on patent damages.11 9 For example, if a first
person sends a copy of Microsoft Word 6.OTM to a second person via
the Internet for illegal use by that second person, the Internet trans-
mission may create thousands of unauthorized copies. However,
Microsoft, the owner of any patent rights in the software, could only
claim damages under theories of reasonable royalty and/or lost prof-
119. Damages may be based upon "established royalty;" see Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S.
152, 165 (1889); Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1952) (accepting a royalty as
"established," it must be set prior to the infringement currently complained of, paid by an ade-
quate number of people to imply reasonableness, and uniform at the places where the licenses
are issued); Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (1983) (rejecting
the cost paid by one licensee as a measure of established royalty is permissible).
Damages may be based upon reasonable royalty; see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United
States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp 1116 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284); Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978); Del Mar Avi-
onics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co,, 836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that dam-
age award must not be less than a reasonable royalty); Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Sup-
ply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (setting a reasonable royalty as the floor below
which a damage award may not fall); Polariod Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1484 (D. Mass. 1990).
Damages may be calculated based upon plaintiff's lost profits or the infringer's financial
gain; see Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931) (holding
that jury may award damages based upon just and reasonable inferences when exact and pre-
cise calculation not possible due to wrongdoer's actions); TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Professional
Positioners, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1017, 1021 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Sun Prods. Group, Inc.
v. B & E Sales Co., 700 F. Supp. 366, 383 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (concluding that "lost profits"
was the only proper measure of damages); Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co., 788 F. Supp.
439 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that a lost profits award requires both "but for" causation of in-
fringement and a proper, lost profits computation); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC Inc., 879 F.2d
820, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d
11, 21 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that the "but for" causation requirement was satisfied for lost
profits when "reasonable probability of sale" exists); Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d
1136, 1140-1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Lain, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1064
(Fed. Cir. 1983). Patent infringement damages are not based simply on a blind assessment of
the number or frequency of copies made.
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its for the single copy of Word 6.OTM and not for the multiple copies
created.
F. The Derivative Copy
For patents of mechanical devices, machines and articles of
manufacture may be infringing under many theories. One may use
literal infringement (is the claim language identical to the accused
device?),120 a function-way-result equivalents test,121  or an
"insubstantial differences" equivalents test.122 If these theories fail, a
plaintiff may attempt to use a theory of contributory infringement 23
or inducement of infringement 24 to support of finding of liability.
One may attempt to use agency law or even vicarious liability theo-
ries.125 Each of these theories may fail to produce a remedy for cer-
tain types of unauthorized copying on the Internet. This is especially
120. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996) (outlining the mod-
em technique for claim interpretation and determination of direct/literal infringement); Engel
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Literal infringement of a
claim exists when every limitation recited in the claim is found in the accused device, i.e.,
when the properly construed claim reads on the accused device exactly.").
121. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-609 (1949)
(holding that if the allegedly infringing product performs substantially the same function, in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result, then it may infringe the patented inven-
tion). See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (holding that legal
equivalents must by found on an element-by-element basis within the patent claims).
122. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jeninson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-19 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (applying the insubstantial differences test for patent infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, which supports the function-way-result methodology but adds additional potential
factors for a court to consider), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
123. See supra note 52.
124. "Inducement of infringement" is similar to contributory infringement, whereby the
inducing party enables a third party to infringe a patent. The inducer actually causes, urges,
directly aids in, or promotes the third party's infringing actions. Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill,
315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963).
125. Von Holdt v. Husky Injection Molding Sys., Ltd., 887 F. Supp. 185, 187 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (plaintiff alleged that under principles of the agency law, defendant has directly in-
fringed plaintiff's patent by supervising, directing and controlling the manufacture of the in-
fringing molds). See also Robert 0. Bolan & William C. Rooklidge, Imputing Knowledge to
Determine Willful Patent Infringement, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 157, 183-90 (1996) (proposing a stan-
dard for imputing knowledge for determining willfulness of patent infringement, based on the
law of agency, which would clarify who within a company has to have knowledge).
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true since patent law does not contain a true analogy to the deriva-
tive work doctrine found in copyright law. 126
For example, copies of a patented program could be reproduced
and distributed through the United States, arguably without infring-
ing its software article of manufacture claims. The program copies,
processed for electronic routing and Internet transmission, may es-
cape infringement challenges by the patented program's owner by
asserting it: (1) does not function in the same way; (2) has substan-
tial differences; and (3) will not have the same result. Moreover, the
copies may not even be recognized as identical to the patented code
for contributory infringement purposes. Even so, the patented pro-
gram's owner can assert that somewhere, someone assisted the in-
fringer in making a 100% total copy and this contributory infringer
should be held liable for damages.
When a piece of code is transmitted on the Internet today, it is
altered from an executable format to a different format. The code is
broken into segmented data packets for piecemeal transmission by
the Internet packing protocol (IP), and these packets contain framing
information, error correction coding, parity information, source ad-
dressing, and/or data addressing. This information, or the program
itself, may have been compressed using common data compression
techniques so that it is no longer directly executable. Or, the infor-
mation may be encrypted to a binary format which substantially dif-
fers from an executable format. Anonymous remailers may afford
individuals the opportunity to communicate anonymously t27
If the software article of manufacture claim contains elements
stating, "a first set of computer instructions which when executed by
a CPU performs an operation," then will the packaged, encrypted,
126. Internet packets or datagrams are units of data transferred from the computer's mem-
ory and packed into a "frame" containing additional information to enable Internet communi-
cation. In this respect, TCP/IP data packets are similar to derivative works. See supra note 78
and accompanying text. While derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright
law(which is particularly attractive for plaintiffs alleging infringing activities on the Internet
since copyright does not require "fixation" to infringe derivative works), patent law does not
provide this avenue of protection.
127. Anonymous remailers are computers that strip any identifying characteristics of
source from TCP/IP datagrams so a recipient computer cannot determine from who or where
the data or software was transmitted. Thus, who should the patent holder sue when he cannot
identify the source of the infringing transmission?
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compressed, non-executable, and anonymous packet traveling along
the telephone lines infringe every element or limitation of this
claim? If one takes a packet from the TCP/IP protocol and tries to
execute it on a computer, the computer will fail to execute the code.
Likewise, if one takes compressed code and tries to directly execute
it on a computer, the computer execution will fail. Finally, if one
takes encrypted code and tries to directly execute it on a computer,
the computer execution will, again, fail.
These derivative copies are problematic to patent holders since
defendants may try to escape liability for patent infringement by as-
serting hyper-technical defenses. Patent drafters must be aware of
these types of copies and draft claims encompassing these modifica-
tion or write specifications whereby these changes are found to be
within the equivalents analysis. 128 This is especially true as online
commerce plays an expanding role in the purchase and transfer of
software.
G. The Transitory Copy or- "8 Copy"
When data is transmitted over conductive copper wire, alumi-
num integrated circuits ("IC") interconnects, optical fiber, etc., it
takes time for the signal to travel from one end of the conductive
line to the other. While in transit, the signal is present on the con-
ductive line for a brief, but stable, moment, similar to data stored in
computer memory. Since patent law has no fixation requirement,
these transitory or delta (5) copies, existing for a brief moment and
then disappearing, may constitute an infringing copy of the patented
software invention. For example, a telephone transmission line is
typically modeled by a T-model or a fI-model as illustrated in Fig. 6
below:
128. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (holding that the "specification remains important, not as the definition of the invention,
but as a description of it and as an aid in interpreting the language of the claims"), rev'd sub
non. on other grounds Wamer-Jenidnson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040
(1997).
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FIGURE 6
A voltage applied across the depicted wire moves a signal from
the right end of the line to the left end of the line only after charging
the capacitors ("C") along the path. Since electronics devices oper-
ate very quickly, the charge need not be present on the line for very
long before being recorded in memory at the left end, and the charge
on the line is quickly replaced with a charge for a following signal in
a very short time serial manner. In a sense, a transmission line, as
illustrated in Fig. 6, is similar to the DRAM illustrated in Fig. 4 due
to their similar capacitive operation. If DRAM copies infringe pat-
ent claims under existing case law, it will be difficult to successfully
argue that other capacitive copies do not also constitute patent in-
fringement, regardless of storage duration (i.e., fixation).
HL[. UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC AND MAGNETIC MEMORY STORAGE
ALONG THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY - A SIMPLIFIED WALK
THROUGH INTERNET-ENABLNG TECHNOLOGY
Now that the software patent claim styles are understood and
the types of copies created on the Internet have been introduced ab-
stractly, it may be helpful to understand exactly where and why these
different types of Internet copies are being made along an Internet
communication path and in modem computer systems. Those read-
ers uninterested in a detailed explanation of the technology involved
with electronic and magnetic memory storage on the Internet, this
section can be skimmed without detracting from the legal content.
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A. Memoy Copies Made to Enable Long-Distance Data Tele-
communications
Fig. 7 illustrates a much-simplified telecommunications system
which could electronically interconnect New York to California
during the hypothetical hacker discussion introduced in Part I.A., su-
pra.
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The hacked software is transmitted from New York to Califor-
nia via the Internet, depicted in Fig. 7 by the large centrally-oriented
"cloud." Currently the Internet encompasses thousands of computer
networks12 9 joined together by computers, referred to as "Internet
routers." These routers are special purpose computers which regu-
late the flow of data at each connection point, or node and then de-
termines the best routing for a packet across the Internet by receiving,
copying, using, and re-transmitting the data packets. Each network
illustrated in Fig. 7 contains one or more computers or sub-networks
of computers. Typically, a network or sub-network will contain tens
to hundreds of individual computers, but it is not unusual for a single
network to comprise of thousands of computers with each computer
communicating to another via different electrical and software
means.
Internet information is transferred from computer-to-computer
and router-to-router along the Internet using a protocol known as
transmission control protocol with Internet packing (TCP/IP). 130
Generally, the IP portion of this protocol segments the transmitted
software, data structures, and/or data into smaller packets of data.
For example, a typical computer program may be time-serially seg-
mented into 1,000 data packets for independent across the Internet.
131 These packets are then individually packaged into a standard
packet format for electronic delivery.
The header of a typical IP datagram contains a version num-
ber,132 a header length field,133 service type field, 34 total length
129. See supra note 6.
130. For a detailed understanding of the workings of TCP/IP, many texts are publicly
available in bookstores or libraries. REGIS J. "BUD" BATES & DONALD GREGORY, VOICE AND
DATA COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK (1996); DOUGLAS E. CoMER, INTERNEMvOKiNG wITH
TCP/IP (2d ed., 1995).
131. Packet switching of data is a simple concept that has been used for decades. Essen-
tially, data packet switching works by breaking down a large file into smaller, more manage-
able and separate chunks of data. Rather than transmitting a 100 megabyte file as one large
file, the file will segmented into thousands of smaller fries and transmitted separately in time
and by different physical paths, if necessary, to a destination that reassembles the smaller files
to recover the 100 megabyte file. If a smaller file is lost, then only the missing smaller file
needs to be re-sent and not the entire 100 megabyte file, thereby saving time and resources.
See David L. Wilson, A Failure to Connect, SAN JOSE MERCURYNEWS, Apr. 20, 1998, at ID.
132. Identifies the version of IP used to transmit and package the datagrams.
133. Gives the length of the header in 32-bit quantities so that the receiving end software
can easily separate header information from data contained in the datagram.
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field,135 identification field, flags, fragment offset field, 3 6 time to
live field, 13 7 protocol indicator, 13 header checksum, 39 source IP ad-
dress, 140 destination IP address,' 41 and optional options section. 142
These datagrams are then presented in a time serial manner to a
serial connection of computers, networks, and routers, as illustrated
in Fig. 7. These computers further process and package the data-
grams, per any hardware limitations, and then physically route the
datagrams from New York to California.
A typical voice telephone call uses circuit switched networks
which establish a dedicated, end-to-end transmission path for the
entire duration of the call. However, packet-switched networks,
used to route data over the Internet, use connectionless delivery sys-
tems. Unlike a vacationer who plans the exact route to get from
home to the vacation spot, the IP datagram knows its starting point
and destination but has no idea what route it will use to reach that
destination. The exact path used to get each data packet to its ulti-
mate destination is determined "on the fly" at each computerized
stop along the information superhighway and may vary as between
packets. 143  The result is each TCP/IP datagram, which together
134. Specifies a priority of the datagram and the type of transport or routing algorithm that
should occur on the Internet.
135. Gives the total length of the datagram in octets (8-bit values) where the maximum
size of a datagram is 65,535 octets.
136. These three fields help further fragment the datagram to accommodate hardware
communication protocols and hardware constraints. Since IP datagrams can be 65,535 octets
long but some network technologies cannot handle frames of 63,535 octets length, the data-
gram may require further segmenting to meet hardware limitations. For example, FDDI can
only handle 4470 octets per frame while Ethernet can only handle up to 1492 octets per frame.
137. From Fig. 7, it is clear that some data packets routing along the Internet may travel
long and indirect paths. In these cases, packets can get lost or inefficiently routed, needlessly
consuming significant bandwidth on the Internet. Therefore, each datagram is given a lifetime
on the Internet. Each router subtracts from the lifespan as time goes on. If the lifetime reaches
zero before the datagram arrives at the destination, the datagram "self-destructs" and an error is
sent back to the source to notify of the "self destruction."
138. Identifies which protocol formatted the data of the datagram.
139. Helps identify errors that have occurred in the header during transmission.
140. Identifies the datagram's source or origination location.
141. Identifies the datagram's final destination.
142. Used primarily for network testing and debugging.
143. Various factors will affect the path the datagram will travel from its current position
to its ultimate destination. Such factors include: loading ofrouters and computers, failures on
the Internet, closest paths, and paths with the least amount of noise.
SOFTWARE PA TENTINFRflVGEMENT
comprise the entire hacked software, may take a different physical
route to arrive at the same destination.
Thus in Fig. 7, a first datagram of the hacked software is il-
lustrated as following a path distinguished by vertical graphical
hatching, whereas a second datagram of the hacked software follows
a path illustrated by horizontal graphical hatching. As shown in Fig.
7, some datagrams of the hacked software will travel the same net-
work links and visit the same routers while journeying from New
York to California. Some routers and computers will route a seem-
ingly random subset of the datagrams of the hacked software on dif-
ferent paths, and other routers may direct only a single datagram of
the hacked software. Many other computers and routers on the In-
ternet will never see a single datagram of the hacked software.
Thus, each computer in each network, and each router along the In-
ternet route from New York to California, may make one or more
slavish total copies, 14 random partial copies, 145 time serial copies, 146
repetitive copies, 147 and/or derivative copies of the hacked soft-
ware, 148 as previously discussed.
The TCP portion of the protocol is the "smarts" of the protocol.
The TCP portion tracks the order of the data packets so that they can
be properly reassembled in the correct order at the intended destina-
tion.
When errors occur or the transmission of a datagram fails, non-
acknowledgment signals are sent to the source of the failed data-
gram. TCP initiates and coordinates the sending of the error signals
and the re-sending of this datagram to complete proper transmission
144. If the patented software invention is small and fits into several thousand bytes of
code, a single routed packet may infringe the claims, by itself.
145. Due to the connectionless nature of TCP/IP paths, each node on the Internet has the
capability of making a copy of at least one, or a subset of all, of the datagrams containing the
software.
146. Even if the patented software does not fit into a single datagram, "bottleneck" routers
and computers that either feed commonly used wide area networks or feed the inputs and out-
puts to the receiving computer in California or the transmitting computer in New York are
likely to create time serial copies since the entire time serial transmission must pass through
these physical connection points.
147. The transmission may encounter errors which will be corrected via TCP by initiating
the re-transfer of erroneous datagrams.
148. Copies that are encrypted, anonymously remailed, compacted, segmented, and pack-
aged into IP packets are derivatives of the original software.
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of the whole hacked software program. Together, TCP/IP and a web
of computers, networks, and routers all transmit the hacked software
from New York to the hacker in California.
Given that the Internet contains millions of computers and rout-
ers, it is not difficult to understand from Fig. 7 that the electronic
trek from New York to California may involve copies made by thou-
sands of computers across the country. In addition, due to the con-
nectionless TCP/IP system, some copies may be created in Canada,
Mexico, or other countries en route from New York to California
thereby involving export and import patent laws. Satellites may be
involved in wireless communications (e.g., Iridium communications
satellites currently orbit over the earth), especially in the near future
as technology rapidly progresses in this area.
Considering Fig. 7 and the above discussion, one could mistak-
enly assume that if the hacked software encountered 100 computers
between New York to California, then 100 unauthorized copies were
made. This is not so. Every computer that receives one or more
datagrams and any computer executing the software will create many
more copies than just one copy per computer. The next few sections
demonstrate how and why multiple copies of the hacked code are
created.
B. Memoyy Copies Made Within a Modern Computer Archi-
tecture
Fig. 8 illustrates a computer system in a simplified block dia-
gram. On the Internet, a communications packet of data may en-
counter a desktop computer, such as a Macintosh ci or an IBM x386
machine; or it may encounter supercomputers, IBM mainframes, or
other complex computer systems. Regardless of the complexity, all
computers encountered by the data packets will contain some micro-
processor coupled to some form of computer memory, as illustrated
in Fig. 8.
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FIGURE 8
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A distinction must be made between a computer transferring the
hacked code as data (which will be done by the routers and most
computers on the Internet) and a computer that will execute the
hacked program once fully transferred over the Internet.
If the computer in Fig. 8 is a router or a packet switching com-
puter for the Internet data packet (assume router for this scenario),
then the hacked program, or portions of the hacked program, will be
received by way of the Ethernet card or modem and be copied into
the router's memory via a direct memory access (DMA) device, mi-
crocontroller, or the microprocessor. Copies will be created and
used by the router's internal CPU and memory, and the data packet
will then be re-transmitted through a modem or an Ethernet device to
the next node. Copies made during these transmission operations
may be slavish total copies, time serial copies, random partial cop-
ies, or other types, as discussed, supra, in Part II.
If the computer of Fig. 8 is executing the hacked software, the
computer will receive the data via the Ethernet card or the modem as
discussed above. A DMA device, microcontroller, the microproces-
sor, or like device will copy the program to the memory. The
hacked program will then be read in pieces by the microprocessor
from the memory and executed to perform useful work. During the
program execution or through use of the operating system of the
computer, the program may be printed, saved to floppy or hard disk,
be sent out on the modem, copied on magnetic tape in the course of
routine backup, display data on a monitor using VRAM, process
sounds or data via a DSP card or sound card, make music on a MIDI
card, or communicate with other devices via a SCSI interface, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 8.
In all, one can roughly approximate that each router and packet
switching computer which receives with the hacked code will create
five copies (Ethernet or modem input copy, microcontroller or DMA
transfer to memory copy, resident memory copy, DMA retransfer
copy, and Ethernet or modem outgoing copy). If the program is
executed, it may create roughly seven copies within the simplified
diagram of Fig. 8. One may assume that if 100 router computers are
encountered on the Internet, roughly 100x5 copies will be made to
route the software with a few more copies being created to execute
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the program. As will be seen, infia, the approximated "500 copies"
of hacked software is a very conservative number from the actual
number of copies created using modem memory and microprocessor
circuits.
C. Memnoiy Copies Made Within Modern Computer Memoy
Devices
Fig. 9 illustrates a simplified, but common, electronic architec-
ture for a typical integrated circuit ("IC") memory component used
in a computer microprocessor. Specifically, the circuitry illustrated
in Fig. 9 is a DRAM memory array, and the memory access and
control circuitry to make the DRAM memory array functional.
358 COMPUTER &IGHTEC-NOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 14
FIGURE 9
The DRAM IC in Fig. 9 is a 16 megabyte (16MB) chip which
contains approximately sixteen million memory bits. Each bit stores
either a "0" (off) or a "1" (on) where collectively a larger group of
these bits represent a software program, database, etc. The memory
array is written to contain data by providing the data to. a Data In
Buffer via the Data parallel interface, as shown in Fig. 9. While data
is provided for writing the specific addresses identifying the location
in the memory array where the incoming data will be stored is pre-
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sented as Address input. Time serial copies of data are created in the
Data In Buffer, while selective time serial copies of the addresses are
made in the Column Address Buffers and the Row Address Buffers.
Most memory devices employ at least a two-dimensional or
two-level address decoding scheme.149 The memory array is a two-
dimensional arrangement of memory cells across a substrate with
each cell storing one bit of digital information. Thus, a Column Ad-
dress portion and a Row Address portion will uniquely identify a
single memory cell among the millions of DRAM cells located on
the IC.
The written digital data moves from the Data In Buffer to the
Sense Amplifier where the digital data is converted to one or more
analog storage pulses. The address information is fed to Row De-
coders and Column Decoders which perform the two-level decode
and memory cell identification operation. Once the proper cell(s)
are identified as the target cells, the data is written from the Sense
Amplifier to the appropriate cells via control signals from the Row
Decoder and Column Decoder. Therefore, every item of data copied
into the memory is saved as data, stored in a buffer, and addressed
via Row and Column Address Buffers which create selective time
serial copies.
To read the stored data, the reverse operation occurs. Ad-
dresses, which identify the cells to read from, are stored in the Row
and Column Address Buffers. The addressed cells are accessed via
control signals from the Row and Column Decoders in response to
the incoming addresses through the Sense Amplifier. The Sense
Amplifier converts the analog signal to a digital signal and sends it
to the Data Out Buffer for communication to the external world via
the Data line.
Every read and write operation creates more than one copy,
even in the simplified memory schematic of Fig. 9. Further, after
149. The use of two-level and multi-level decoding systems are well-known and used in
many facets of life. For example, many street maps divide a geographic area into squares, and
the reader may locate specific streets or landmarks on the map by using the grid coordinates.
Likewise, the postal office uses a multi-level decoding system to deliver mail; to send a letter
in the United States, one must provide a street address, name of city, name of state, and zip
code. By dividing a large location into two or multiple levels, errors are reduced and the sim-
plicity of use and design are achieved.
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the data is stored, the data or voltage begins to deteriorate, as de-
picted in Fig. 5,150 so that redundant copies need to be made by the
Refresh Controller in Fig. 9 to avoid data loss. Even ignoring the
refreshing operation, four or five copies may be generated in every
memory IC encountered on the Internet. Thus, the 500 copies ap-
proximated in Part IIH. B., supra, are quadrupled to 2,000 copies due
to the memory architecture used in common computer systems. 15'
D. Memory Copies Made Within a Modern High-Speed Micro-
processor
Fig. 10152 below illustrates a modem microprocessor 53 of the
type commonly used in computer systems. The specific microproc-
essor illustrated below is a PowerPCTMtm 604 microprocessor which
is currently manufactured and distributed by both Motorola and
IBM. The PowerPCTM 604 microprocessor is installed in personal
computers (PCs) and workstations that may be linked to the Internet.
By understanding the high-level workings of the processor in Fig.
10, the reader will also gain an understanding of how other types of
modem microprocessors work.
150. See supra Part II.E.
151. 2,000 copies is, again, a conservative estimate given the complexity of modem
memory architectures, pipelining, DMA control, microcontrollers, buffering, etc.
152. Motorola Inc. owns the copyright to Fig. 10, used herein with permission.
153. Also referred to as a central processing unit (CPU).
154. PowerPC is a trademark of IBM.
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FIGURE 10
In Fig. 10, the components which perform computer instruction
execution are shaded while the non-shaded components are
"overhead" and simply provide information to the shaded units. The
high-level operation of a modem CPU is not complicated. A Bus
Interface Unit (BIU) is illustrated in Fig. 10 as part of the micro-
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processor. The BIU accesses memory 55 and peripherals external to
the microprocessor using an address bus, a data bus, and control sig-
nal. Most data and computer instructions provided to and from the
microprocessor are routed through the BIU; the BIU is the micro-
processor's connection to the external world. The BIU creates time
serial copies of the program and data structures stored in external
memory when transferring this information to and from the shaded
units depicted in Fig. 10.
The BIU in Fig. 10 splits data and computer executable instruc-
tions read from external memory into two separate electrical paths
within the microprocessor. Instructions are cached/stored in an In-
struction Cache (I-Cache) while data is cached/stored in a Data
Cache (D-Cache), where the I-Cache and D-Cache are separate
memory units within the microprocessor.156 Many other microproc-
essors have a unified cache where both data and instructions are
stored in the same internal cache memory. The caches in Fig. 10
will make selective copies or selective time serial copies of the soft-
ware and data from external memory.
Data from the D-Cache is provided to and from the shaded ar-
eas of Fig. 10 through use of a Store Queue, a Load Queue, and a
Data Memory Management Unit (DMMU). The Store and Load
Queues maintain temporary copies of stores 157 and loads' which are
to occur in the D-Cache, thereby performing a buffering-type func-
tion. 59 The DMMU is the control unit or special purpose CPU
which regulates the read, write, and control of the data in the D-
155. Similar to memory devices, as discussed supra in Part II.
156. For example, a computer instruction like "ADD x,y" commands a computer to add
the number "x" to the number "y." The computer would place the ADD instruction into the I-
Cache and the data "x" and "y" into the D-Cache.
157. A "store" operation takes data from within the microprocessor (e.g., PentiumnT or
PowerPCTM 604) and writes the data to a memory device external to the microprocessor (e.g.,
32 Megabyte DRAM SIMMs).
158. A "load" works in reverse from a store operation. A load takes data from external
memory and provides it internally to the CPU; therefore, loads and stores provide a bi-
directional path for computer code and data between the memory devices and the CPU.
159. Buffers are used so that different units may run at different speeds without perform-
ance or data loss. If a device provides five items which need to be processed within a time N
and the receiving unit can only process one item in time N, then a buffer stores the remaining
four items until the receiving unit can process them.
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Cache. Additional copies of computer data may be made in the
DMIVIU and the Load and Store Queues.
Instructions are provided to the shaded components in Fig. 10
through a Fetch Unit. The Fetch Unit is a special purpose CPU sec-
tion responsible for reading instructions from external memory via
the BIU and I-Cache. Once the Fetch Unit receives executable in-
structions, the instructions are queued in the Instruction Queue to
provide some buffering between the shaded components in Fig. 10
and the Fetch Unit. The Dispatch Unit monitors the shaded units in
Fig. 10 and ensures that these units are busy executing instructions
from the Instruction Queue and not lying dormant for too long. If
more useful work can be done by a newly-dormant unit, the Dispatch
Unit sends it another instruction to process. Therefore, these units
are also busy making copies of the software code.
In summary, the BIJ, D-Cache, DMMU, Load Queue, and
Store Queue provide data to the shaded units in Fig. 10. The BIU, I-
Cache, Fetch Unit, Instruction Queue, and Dispatch Unit provide ex-
ecutable computer instructions to the shaded components in Fig. 10.
Each unit makes one or more type of electronic copies as they oper-
ate. 60
In Fig. 10, two banks of registers are illustrated. The General
Purpose Register File contains registers 161 for storing data as are
temporarily needed for the shaded components in Fig. 10. The
Floating Point Register File contains floating point data used by the
Floating Point Unit.
Fig. 10 shows six units which are used to execute computer in-
structions. Many of the shaded components in Fig. 10 are capable of
operating parallel in time so that more than one instruction can be
processed at any one overlapping time period. Computer code from
memory is fetched and executed sequentially through memory ad-
dresses unless a branch instruction is executed, sending the program
execution to a newm non-sequential location. 162 The Branch Proc-
160. See discussion supra in Part II.
161. Registers are mini-RAM elements that store 8-bit, 16-bit, 32-bit, 64-bit or other small
portions of software or data.
162. Computer instructions stored in addresses 1 through 10 in memory are typically exe-
cuted sequentially from 1 to 10 unless some computer instruction tells the fetching and exe-
cuting operation to go to another address/location of memory.
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essing Unit predicts and functions to execute these branch instruc-
tions which change the flow and location of instructions fetched
from memory by the Fetch Unit. Fig. 10 illustrates three Integer
Units which handle integer operations. 163 Fig. 10 illustrates a Float-
ing Point Unit which processes floating point instructions' 4 which
manipulate floating point numbers. 165 A Load and Store Unit in Fig.
10 initiate read and write operations to external memory through the
D-Cache.
Fig. 10 illustrates a microprocessor which can be used to trans-
fer data on the Internet or execute code once the hacked code has
been fully downloaded from the Internet. When the processor oper-
ates to route or move software as data on the Internet, the data paths
within the microprocessor will make copies of the hacked software.
However, code being executed though the instruction path of the mi-
croprocessor will not be infringing code but will simply be the code
needed to route and process the hacked software on the Internet.
The microprocessor's goal when operating in this routing mode is to
receive the hacked program as data from an incoming/input source
(e.g., a modem, FDDI input, an Ethernet link, etc.) and move the
data to the computer's output line to transmit the data towards its fi-
nal destination while ensuring the transmitted data's integrity.
In essence, when the microprocessor is functioning as an Inter-
net router, the hacked program traverses the following path when re-
ceived as microprocessor input in order to determine the proper out-
put destination, proper routing, and error information: (1) into the
BIU; (2) into the D-Cache; (3) into the Load Queue; (4) through the
Load and Store Unit; (5) to the General Purpose Registers; or (6) to
163. Integers are number that contain no values right of a decimal point. For example, 12,
350, and -24 are integers, whereas 3.14159 is not an integer but a floating point number. Inte-
gers are represented in computers in a simple manner and can be processed easily by special
purpose hardware Integer Units. Integer operations include: shift right, shift left, add, subtract,
XOR, AND, OR, multiply, and divide.
164. Floating point instructions include: add, subtract, divide, multiply, sine, cosine, and
arc-tangent.
165. Floating point numbers are represented in a computer by a more complex format than
integers. A floating point number is stored as a mantissa, a sign, and an exponent. Therefore,
the number -1.123x10' is stored in three segmented values where the mantissa is 1.123, the
sign bit is negative, and the exponent is 5. Due to the three fields of a floating point value,
floating point operations are harder to process than integer operations and require their own
special hardware.
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the Integer Units for at least one copy and interactive processing step
among all the previously mentioned resources. On the way back out
of the microprocessor to the output of the computer, the microproc-
essor creates roughly the same six copies in reverse. Therefore, even
ignoring the repetitive copies made in the processing phase of the
operation, roughly twelve copies are made in order to route the data
though the microprocessor when performing Internet routing of the
Internet datagrams.
E. Unauthorized Software Copies Created on the Internet
Compounding these (twelve) copies with the 100 router com-
puters encountered by the hacked software, while traveling from
New York to California via the Internet, results in a total of 1200
copies. Adding this number to the current number of copies from
memory within each of the 2,000 copies made in memory of a mi-
croprocessor, we have 3,200 illicit copies created from New York to
California (100 routing computers multiplied by four copies in the
computer, multiplied by five copies in the computer main memory,
plus 100 x twelve copies made by the microprocessors while rout-
ing).
In addition to these copies, many microcontrollers perform data
movement operation within the computers other than the main mi-
croprocessor. Assume that these microcontrollers are as complex
as the main microprocessor and that each one of these devices makes
roughly three copies. 66 Many microcontrollers may be encountered
by the hacked software in one computer. To be conservative, as-
sume only two microcontrollers or special purpose peripheral CPUs
are encountered on each of the 100 router computers- one for in-
coming datagrams and one for outgoing datagrams. This adds 600
more copies for a total of 3,800 potential copies from New York to
California.
The above 3,800 hacked copies made across the globe assumes
that the only microprocessor operating or transferring the data within
the computer was the central microprocessor and two microcontrol-
lers in at least one peripheral device. This is usually not the reality
166. See HC1 1 MicroController Databooks available from Motorola, Inc.
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of computer systems. Every function in the computer, memory ac-
cess, printer storage, serial interface buffering, modem storage and
control, Ethernet card storage and control, are all done by microcon-
trollers which are special purpose microprocessors that make elec-
tronic copies, but usually not to the extent of the main microproces-
sor. Thus, the 3,800 potential illicit copies are an overly cautious
estimate.
Assuming that one thousand users now access and download the
hacked code from the site where the hacked code was posted, then
3,800xl,000 copies have been made resulting in the creation of
3,800,000 infringing copies, worldwide. If several hackers operate
in parallel with each other, hacking many different types of software
on the Internet, then it is easy to see how millions or even billions of
infringing copies can be made on the Internet in just one day. Such
mass infringement may involve the Internet-enabling entities who
may be named in the lawsuit under direct or contributory infringe-
ment theories.
Now that the vast extent of these electronic copies are under-
stood, it is important to determine if these electronic copies will cre-
ate patent infringement liability for Internet-enabling entities or if
patent law will provide some type of protection.
IV. SoFTwARE PATENT DIRECT INFRINGEMENT ARGUMENTS MAY BE PUT
FORTH IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A REMEDY
There are no software patent cases directly on point which held
that Internet-enabling entities will either be liable as direct infringers
or sheltered from direct infringement liability in a patent law con-
text. However, some copyright precedents indicate that direct in-
fringement of patent claims may succeed in certain patent infringe-
ment circumstances.' 67  One copyright infringement example is
demonstrated in Sega Enteiprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA. 16s
167. Generally, while copyright law and patent law differ in substantial ways, copyright
law and patent law are both intellectual property legal doctrines that are subjected to the same
policy discussions and policy implications. Thus, the underlying and related policies ad-
dressed in copyright law may be applicable to patent law cases, especially those cases of first
impression where copyright policy is discussed. See Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (explaining that it is appropriate to refer to patent case law
in copyright cases because "of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law);
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In Sega, the defendant ran a computer bulletin board service 169
("BBS") which allowed users to upload and download illegal copies
of software programs. Many of the software programs uploaded and
downloaded to the defendant's bulletin board via bulletin board users
were infringements on Sega's copyrights. The court in Sega stated,
"Sega has established a likelihood of success on the merits of show-
ing a prima facie case of direct and contributory infringement by De-
fendants' operation of the MAPHIA bulletin board." 170 Although the
Court in Sega seemed to focus on the culpability, knowledge, intent,
and level of inducement by the defendant,171 the mere fact that the
Court still found direct infringement, which does not require intent,
knowledge, inducement, etc., suggests a willingness by courts to find
direct infringement by Internet service providers. Although the de-
fendant in Sega acted with volition and was clearly culpable, the
holding indicates that direct infringement liability may be placed on
the Internet-enabling entities by passively providing the means by
which directly infringing Internet copies are created.172
Another copyright case that may affect the imputing of direct
infringement liability is Frena.73 In Frena, the court found direct
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Amer. Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (1st Cir. 1994);
Pro-CD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166 (7th Cir. 1996); Image Tech.
Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (9th Cir. 1997). For a recent exam-
ple where a software copyright claim and patent software claim were filed together and consid-
ered in unison, see Cabinet Vision v. Cabinetware, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1683, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
168. Sega, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding direct and contributory copyright
infringement by computer bulletin board service company and individual in control of bulletin
board who knew and facilitated the creation of unauthorized copies of video games when such
illegal copies were uploaded to the bulletin board by unknown users and subsequently down-
loaded by users to make additional copies).
169. A "computer bulletin board system" which is an older term for a modem or Internet
accessible computer server.
170. Id. at 687.
171. Id.
172. See also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that by renting rooms to the public to view video cassettes obtained from any source,
defendant has infringed the owner's exclusive rights to authorize public performances of the
copyrighted work). But see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435
(1984) (finding that where public policy and the public good of enabling copying may require
that none of direct or contributory infringement be found). Note that the Court in Sega also
found both contributory infringement and direct infringement of copyright.
173. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (finding that electronic bulletin
board service operator was liable for the transfer of copied, digitized photographs through his
bulletin board despite the operator's lack of knowledge of the transfer).
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infringement by the defendant and held "[t]here is no dispute that
Defendant Frena supplied a product containing unauthorized copies
of a copyrighted work. It does not matter that Defendant Frena
claims he did not make the copies itself [sic]."' 174 The findings in
Frena suggest that even if an Internet-enabling entity committed no
act having any nexus to their user's infringement, a court may still
be inclined to fid direct infringement. Further, without requiring
volition of any kind, the Frena court stated:
There is irrefutable evidence of direct copyright infringe-
ment in this case. It does not matter that Defendant Frena
may have been unaware of the copyright infringement. In-
tent to infringe is not needed to fid copyright infringement.
Intent or knowledge is not an element of infringement, and
thus even an innocent infringer is liable for infringement. 75
While patent law and copyright law differ in some significant
manners, the same Internet public policy will undoubtedly influence
both patent and copyright law on the Internet. Therefore, one may
study recent copyright case laws and the public policy voiced in
these opinions to gain insight as to what direction the patent in-
fringement doctrine on the Internet will develop.176 Given this lan-
guage from Frena, it seems that a passive Internet-enabling entity
may be found liable through patent law even if infringement oc-
curred without the entity's knowledge, intent, committing an act, or
having volition with some reasonable nexus to the infringing activ-
ity.
It is not the author's contention that Frena and/or Sega were
decided wrongly. In fact, with the apparent culpability and knowl-
edge of the defendants in both of these cases, it seems that a finding
of some sort of infringement was necessary to deter this type of
wrongful conduct. The author mere notes that the courts deciding
Sega and Frena seemed to go out of their way to find direct in-
fringement where contributory infringement, vicarious liability, or
inducement would have served the same purpose. By stretching to
find direct infringement, a broad reading/interpretation of either
174. Id. at 1556.
175. Id. at 1559.
176. See discussion supra Part I. (or page 105)
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Frena or Sega by any other federal court could result in very passive
and unculpable defendants being held liable under a direct infringe-
ment strict liability theory in both a copyright context and a patent
context via Internet activity.
Due to this case law, the original software owners harmed by
Internet hacking may attempt to use direct infringement to impose
liability on Internet-enabling entities involved in the infringing trans-
fer of the patented material, even absent both volition and in-
tent/knowledge. This type of claim is especially likely to occur
when the hacker is judgment proof or concealed by anonymous re-
mailing, encryption, and/or like technology manufactured, owned, or
operated by the Internet-enabling entity. The software owner can
argue that 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) grants the patent owner has the right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or im-
porting the patented software. Though of these five elements, only
three -making, using, and importing - may be problematic for an In-
ternet-enabling entity. Additionally, the ability to "export" TCP/IP
Internet datagrams to foreign countries may result in liability under
35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
A. The Right to Exclude Others From "Making"
The software patent owner may argue that the memory devices,
processors, computers, telecommunication sites, and networks that
together comprise the Internet all made infringing copies 177 of the
hacked software in order to transfer the hacked software across the
U.S. or globe. The integrated circuits (ICs), computers, and mem-
ory/storage devices on the Internet were designed, owned, and oper-
ated for the purpose of making automatic and infringing copies of
the patented software or database. The software patent owner will
also argue that the Internet-enabling entities need not have any intent
or knowledge and need not even commit the actual act or volition of
making the copies as in Sega and/or Frena to be found strictly liable
as direct infringers. 78
177. See discussion supra Part Ill.
178. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that patent law
forbids independent creation of the patented matter and a finding of infringement needs no
intent or knowledge); Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir.
1959) (finding that infringement does not depend on the infringer's good faith or innocent
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The Intemet-enabling entities will argue that the article of
manufacture claims, the Alappat means-plus-function claims, and
the data structure claims require two main elements in order to be
directly infringed. The first element required is the storage medium,
machine, computer, memory/storage, and/or a like hardware ele-
ment required under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in order to create an enforce-
able software claim.179 The other required element in order to di-
rectly infringe the claim is the software resident within the hardware
element.
The Intemet-enabling entities will argue that they only provided
the hardware device, and that the hacker provided the software
whereby the only viable theory under which the providers can be
held liable is under a contributory theory for contributing and con-
trolling the providing of only a portion of the infringing entity. This
situation of "making" of the infringing copies seems best suited for
the theory of contributory infringement which was developed to
handle the infringer that provided a smaller fraction of a total pat-
ented combination. It seems inequitable, given the large damages
and ease of creating large damages on the Internet, that an Internet-
enabling entity that had no knowledge/intent to infringe and had no
human volition or act associated with the infringing act, other than
enabling automatic mechanical reproduction or manufacturing, sell-
ing, and maintaining Internet equipment, should be found directly
liable. Some act of infringement with some non-mechanical nexus
mind-set); Metal Film Co. v. Melton Corp., 316 F. Supp. 96, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding
that neither lack of knowledge of the patent nor lack of intent to infringe is a defense for the
issue of patent infringement); Playboy Enters, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1555
(M.D.Fla. 1993); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
179. Decades of federal case law have engrained hardware limitations into software claims
for the sole purpose of allowing software claims to surpass the patentable subject matter hurdle
of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The addition in the claim of well known hardware, structure, memory,
storage, computer components, etc. does little to overcome art rejections under 35
U.S.C. § § 102-103. Therefore, it seems ironic that the hardware limitations in a software
claim, which were added or included to the claim to satisfy decades of engrained 35
U.S.C. § 101 formalities, may now incur liability to the hardware manufacturers. One should
ask, would it be best to dispense with the form-over-function hardware limitations in the claim
and allow the claiming of the software absent a "tangible" medium to avoid imposing con-
tributory liability on hardware manufacturers? See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972);
Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr. 450 U.S. 175 (1981); In re Freeman,
573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684
F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982), for historical law on the development of hardware limitations in
software claims.
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to the infringing activity should be required in order to directly in-
fringe.-8 O
Therefore, finding direct infringement by Internet-enabling en-
tities under the theory of excluding the automatic "making" of in-
fringing copies would seem to be misapplication of the concept of
direct infringement of patent claims, as was noticed in Netcom in an
Internet copyright context. 81 A more rational approach would be to
utilize a theory of contributory infringement if the right to exclude
the "making" of copies was the right relied upon by the original
software owner. Once you consider the fact that it is desirable to:
(1) avoid or reduce the high quantity of damage and infringing ac-
tivity that can occur on the information superhighway in a very brief
period of time without any intent or knowledge on the part of the
Internet-enabling entities; (2) maintain the cost of Internet access
within a feasible range for further U.S. economic and technological
growth; and (3) avoid any chilling effect on new products and future
innovations related to the information superhighway, then it is very
likely that any theory of direct infringement under the "making" ele-
ment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) should fail for passive nonvolitional In-
ternet-enabling entities.
B. The Right to Exclude Others From "Using"
In addition to claiming that the Internet-enabling entities in-
fringed due to the "making" of infringing copies, the original soft-
180. Eastman Oil Well Survey Co. v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 131 F.2d 884, 887
(5th Cir. 1943) (holding that liability is based upon "what the defendant is doing' under direct
infringement); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (finding defendants personally liable for acts of direct infringement) (emphasis added).
"Act" may also include omission or failure to act after one is given knowledge of infringement.
Suppose one told an Internet entity that infringing software was on his service and he chose to
do nothing for two years? See Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc. v. Home Prod. Mktg., Inc., 929 F.
Supp. 1114, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (concluding that either acts or omissions accompanied by
knowledge can result in direct infringement). It seems that although strict liability does not
require intent or knowledge of infringement, it does require that the defendant do some con-
scious act or volition with some nexus to the infringement. It seems suspect that a defendant
who had no knowledge and performed only an automatic act that required no volition would be
liable for massive damage on the Internet, especially when the Internet provides substantial
public benefit over and above infringing activities.
181. See infra Part IV. B. for a more detailed discussion of Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368
(finding no direct infringement for copyright law on the Internet when no volitional act is
found on the part of defendant; automatic copies should not result in direct infringement li-
ability).
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ware owner may bring suit relying on the right to exclude others
from "using" of the infringing work. The original software owner
may argue that it is immaterial as to how the work was made, and
that after the work was made on the hardware via the Internet, the
Internet-enabling entities used the copy to facilitate Internet transfer.
The original software owner will argue that 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) uses
the disjunctive form of "or" that implies that one is liable for in-
fringement by "using" even if sale, offer for sale, importation, or
making are absent.182 The original software owner will state that
"use" is broadly defined, and arguably, need not be for infringing
software execution, but need only be used in Internet transferring in
order to constitute infringement. Sometimes, mere storage or
backup with the ability to use, even absent any real use, may argua-
bly constitute "using" under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).18 3 The patent owner
will also argue that the "use" need not be the contemplated use of
software execution and need only be any use of the software, such as
Internet transmission.'"
The defenses and policy against any finding of direct infringe-
ment for both "making" and "using" in this patent infringement hy-
pothetical are best discussed with respect to Netcom. 85 Even though
Neteom is a copyright infringement case, the policy considerations
and remarks made therein are very insightful and well-suited to strict
liability patent law as it should apply to the Internet.
182. For the historical creation of this line of thinking, see Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U.S. 71
(1887). See also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964)
(holding that unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement); Roche Prods., Inc. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("It is well-established that the
use of a patented invention, without either manufacture or sale, is actionable.").
183. See Olsson v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 495 (Ct. Cl. 1938); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (having a system act as a backup mode or to
provide an extra yet unused measure of safety constitutes "use").
184. See American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 105 n.10 (D. Del. 1989)
("one cannot escape infringement by merely taking the claimed structure and using it in a way
that differs from the description contained in the preferred embodiment."); E.I. DuPont de Ne-
mours & Co. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 833 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (entitling patentee to any
use of the patented structure even if the use was previously unknown to him). Some case law
refers to this theory as the "all uses" theory. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938); Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., 122 F.2d 702, 703,
706 (3d Cir. 1941).
185. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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In Netcom, the court found that the service providers and Inter-
net-enabling corporations enabled a system that operated without
human intervention (i.e., there was no volitional act or intent or
knowledge by the defendants). Since there was no human interven-
tion on the defendant's part, the defendant in Netcom could not be
the one who created the copies via an infringing act. Even though
intent is not an issue in strict liability, there needs to be an act or
some element of volition with causation to the infringing copy which
is totally lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to
automatically or mechanically create a copy by a third party.
The court in Netcom also concluded that the defendant BBS op-
erator correctly distinguished its situation from another case, MA!
Systems Coip. v. Peak Computer Inc.,18 6 which found violation of
copyright law when Peak Computer transferred copyrighted software
into RAM. The defendant in Netcom pointed out that it had not
taken any affirmative action directly resulting in any copying of
plaintiffs' works, other than installing and maintaining a system
whereby software automatically forwards messages received from
subscribers onto the Usenet, and temporarily and automatically
stores copies on its system. The court further stated that "Netcom's
actions, to the extent that they created a copy of plaintiffs' works,
were necessary to having a working system for transmitting Usenet
postings to and from the Internet." The defendant in Netcom did not
initiate the copying or act with volition, whereas the defendants in
MA! infringed the plaintiff's copyright by taking some affirmative
action to create the infringing copy. 187 Therefore, the court reasoned
in Netcom that the system incidentally creating temporary copies of
plaintiffs' works does not mean Netcom has caused the copying.188
186. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
187. MAI held copyrights to an operating system (OS) that it sold to third parties. Peak
Computer was providing competitive maintenance and support services for the computers and
software, including the MAI OS, that were in possession by the third parties. To service their
clients' machines and/or the MAI OS, the personnel from Peak loaded and executed MAI's OS
from the computer's memory. Peak's employees would actually perform the affirmative act of
making the infringing copy of the MAI OS by switching on the client's computer, thereby
loading the software into the computer's RAM. The court found that this act of turning on the
computer was a sufficiently affirmative and volitional act by Peak to impute liability for direct
infringement.
188. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-69.
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Furthermore, the Netcom court stated that "contributory in-
fringement is more appropriate for dealing with BBS liability, first,
because it focuses attention on the BBS-users relationship and the
way imposing liability on BBS operators may shape this relation-
ship, and second because it better addresses the complexity of the
relationship between BBS operators and subscribers."'8 9 This ration-
ale seems to be equally applicable to patent law when considering
whether to use a contributory infringement analysis versus direct in-
fringement analysis.
In addition, the Netcom court declared that any holding to the
alternative, where direct liability is possible, would result in
"unreasonable liability" that could jeopardize the entire Internet or
raise transactional costs so high that the Internet would be economi-
cally crippled in the U.S.19o This increased cost and chilling effect
on the Internet would result regardless of whether copyright or pat-
ent infringement is asserted by the plaintiff.
Another rationale considered by the court in Netcom was that
"if an entity provided only the wires and conduits - such as the
telephone company, it would have a good argument for an exemp-
tion if it was truly in the same position as a common carrier and
could not control who or what was on its system."'191 The Internet-
enabling entities can be likened to common carriers as they are pas-
sive entities that merely manufacture, provide, own, or operate the
system that enables useful public Internet communication. This
benefit to the public should not be hampered by massive liability un-
der direct infringement, especially when no intent/knowledge and no
volition are found on the part of the defendant.
The court in Netcom cited and distinguished Sega. The court in
Sega found that the defendant's knowledge of the infringing activi-
ties, encouragement to infringe, direction and provision of the facili-
ties for infringement through his operation of the BBS constituted
direct and contributory infringement, even though the defendant did
189. Id. at 1369.
190. Id.
191. Id. at n.12 (quoting Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and
the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights 122 (1995)).
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not know exactly when files were on the BBS.1 92 It is clear that a
very large majority of the Internet-enabling entities provide no en-
couragement, incentive, or direction promoting any patent infringe-
ment over the Internet. In addition, no permanent archives are
maintained by a large majority of the Internet-enabling entities.1 93
Netcomn found that there would be no purpose served by holding
liable those who have no ability to control the information to which
their subscribers have access. 94 If you enjoin an Internet-enabling
company, how can they stop the infringement when they have no di-
rect control over the use of their provided, manufactured, or owned
resources? 95 What infringement deterrent is achieved by assigning
massive damage liability to an entity that cannot cost-effectively
avoid subsequent infringing acts? The court in Netcom recognized
that billions of bits of data flow through the Internet every day, these
bits are necessarily stored on servers throughout the network, and it
is impossible to screen out infringing bits from noninfringing bits
while keeping transaction costs reasonable. 96  In addition, under
Netcoin, vicarious liability cannot bootstrap a defendant into direct
infringement liability since there is no financial gain to the Internet-
enabling companies by virtue of the hacking and infringement. 197
192. Id. at 1370.
193. Id. at 1372.
194. Id.
195. The whole point of Internet service providers (ISPs) controlling or monitoring the
content of their systems is a mess and a "no-win" situation for them. Libel law suggests that if
the ISP controls or monitors the content of its service, it may be found liable for the libel. See
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Supp.); Cubby v. Com-
puserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.
1996). This may inadvertently encourage an ISP should not monitor the activity on its system
to avoid certain liability exposure. However, copyright law on the Internet suggests that strict
liability may punish the ISP that does not attempt to look for and remove the infringing content
off of its service. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Patent law may find that if the ISP controls the
content of its service, it may have enough control to come closer to a finding a vicarious li-
ability and may have the needed volition or lack of volition accompanied with knowledge to
find direct liability. Therefore, if an ISP monitors content, it is in a liability situation, but if it
decides not to monitor content, the ISP is still exposed to liability.
196. Screening methods may provide futile if the sender uses technologies such as en-
cryption, compression, etc.
197. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375 (defendant is liable under vicarious liability doctrines
for the actions of a primary infringer where the defendant: (1) has the right and ability to con-
trol the infringer's acts; and (2) receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement).
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In essence, the Netcom court was swayed by the fact that: (1)
the defendant took no affirmative action or conmitted no volitional
act to facilitate the creation of the copy; (2) no human intervention
was needed since the copies were automatic; (3) the copies are
needed in order to maintain a functional Internet that is very benefi-
cial to the public; (4) the liability imposed on Internet-enabling enti-
ties would be massive, repetitive, and crippling to the Internet indus-
try; (5) contributory infringement is more appropriate for providers
since it requires knowledge and some contributory volition; (6) pas-
sive providers of a communication conduit and system should not be
liable in a manner similar to the fact that a phone company is not li-
able for slander; (7) Internet-enabling companies do not provide en-
couragement, incentive, or direction promoting any copyright in-
fringement and therefore inducement theories provide some
protection; (8) very few, if any, entities on the Internet keep a perma-
nent archive of the infringing file which could be problematic upon
marking or notice to the archiver followed by inaction to remove the
infringing copies; (9) an injunction or court order cannot be effective
since the Intemet-enabling entities have no direct control over the
system or its use; (10) it is impossible to screen infringing work from
non-infringing work even if a close and vigilant watch is maintained
at great cost; and (11) vicarious liability does not apply for many In-
ternet-enabling entities since there is no financial gain to most of the
Internet-enabling entities from the infringement and there usually is
an extreme lack of ability to control the use of their resources. These
arguments seem equally persuasive and insightful in patent law, as
well as for copyright law, as these insights pertain to the Internet.
Therefore, it seems reasonable that direct patent infringement
by virtue of automatic "making" and/or "using" should not be found
against mere passive Internet-enabling entities that have committed
no volitional acts having a direct nexus to the infringement. By not
allowing direct infringement claims to succeed against passive Inter-
net-enabling entities in a manner similar to Netcom and Sony, theo-
ries of inducement, contributory infringement, direct infringement
involving volitional acts, vicarious liability, and the like still provide
ample disincentive to knowing and volitional Internet infringement
and will result in imposing liability on all culpable Internet infring-
SOFTWARE PATENT INFR INGEMENT
ers as clearly seen in Sega and Frena.t98 In general, inducement,
contributory infringement, direct infringement involving volitional
acts, vicarious liability, and the like will protect passive Internet-
enabling entities while finding culpable Internet-enabling entities li-
able in a well-balanced Internet liability system.
C. Importing TCP/IP Datagrams on Internet Lines
When transmitting Internet datagrams using the TCP/IP con-
nectionless protocol, Internet datagrams may be imported into the
U.S. and exported out of the U.S. to effectuate global Internet com-
munications. The importation and exportation of these datagrams
and the liability that may result under patent law is the subject of the
next two sections.
Liability for importation of the infringing piece of software or
data structure is provided by 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)199 and/or 35
U.S.C. § 271(g). 200 Assume that a hacker copies an infringing pro-
gram from Germany to the United States. Due to the connectionless
nature of the TCP/IP Internet protocol, different parts of infringing
software or database can come into the country through different
states and finally create a 100% slavish total copy in one or more
U.S. states. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), the importation analysis is
similar to the "using" and "making" direct infringement analysis
discussed, supra, in Part II since in order to import an object from
the Internet, a copy must be "made" or "used" before, during, and
198. See discussion supra Part IV-IV. A.
199. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells, any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
200. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) provides: Whoever without authority imports into the United
States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a
process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to
sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for
infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the
noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this
title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that
product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be
considered to be so made after-
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial
and nonessential component of another product.
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988).
19981
378 COMPUTER & IGHTECINOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 14
after the importation occurs. Thus, passive entities having no voli-
tion or nexus to the infringement should not be liable for this in-
fringing importation, similarly to that examined in the Netcom deci-
sion.
Regarding 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) some hurdles are placed into the
statutory language that should give some protection to Internet-
enabling entities. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), infringement may be
avoided if the product being imported into the United States was ei-
ther (1) materially changed by a foreign process; or (2) "becomes a
trivial and nonessential component of another product." Given the
technological working of the Internet, including data packeting,
compression, encryption, telecommunication protocol alteration,
etc., one may attempt to argue that the imported product was materi-
ally changed by one or more foreign processes before importation.20'
Therefore, the exception under § 271(g)(1) for imported objects
which have been materially changed may give some protection to
Internet-enabling entities involved in passive importation.
While § 271(g)(1) offers some protection, it seems unlikely that
§ 271(g)(2) will offer any protection. It is improbable that a neces-
sary fraction of the code imported into the United States via a
TCP/IP datagram which is required for program proper execution
and transmitted for the express purpose of being put together with
other TCP/IP datagrams coming over the Internet could be called
trivial, or nonessential, to the software program. Consequently, the
§ 271(g)(2) "nonessential component" exception will not include
any TCP/IP datagram which enters the United States.
In any event, it is likely that importation and exportation of
TCP/IP Internet packets over the Internet could create liability
problems for Internet-enabling entities, even if passively involved,
due to the lack of a volitional act and the courts' willingness to cast
a broad net for direct infringement, as found in both Sega and Frena.
201. See Eli Lilly and Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(finding that if a patentee has a patent on X and X is "materially changed by subsequent proc-
esses" before it is imported, then no infringement will be found); Bio-Technology Gen. Corp.
v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the "materially changed"
exception of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) requires that "at a minimum, that there be a real difference
between the product imported, offered for sale, sold, or used in the United States and the prod-
ucts produced by the patented process"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 274 (1996).
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D. Exporting TCP/IP Datagrams on Internet Lines
Various Internet copies, such as the time serial copy or the
100% slavish total copy may result in direct infringement due to ex-
portation of TCP/IP datagrams out of the U.S. on Internet communi-
cation lines. It was unclear throughout patent law history whether
time serial copies themselves constitute infringement under either
direct or contributory infringement. This issue was first faced by the
Supreme Court in Deepsouth.202
In Deepsouth, the defendant manufactured all the parts of a
claimed invention. The defendant then individually boxed each of
the parts and shipped them to a foreign location where a completed
product containing all of the parts was put together. This situation is
similar to the time serial memory device since a time serial memory
device manufactures or copies all of the parts of the program one
after another in a same location but never puts them together to form
the entire program during one overlapping point in time.203 Assem-
bling the entire program after Internet transmission completes is left
to another device at the receiving end (analogous to the foreign
country in Deepsouth).
The Fifth Circuit found infringement in the case of Deep-
south;2°4 however, the Supreme Court later reversed the FifthCir-
cuit's decision, holding that no infringement occurs when the parts
of the invention are created while the total combination of the parts
into a complete unit does not occur within the physical domain of
the patent's protection (i.e., the United States and its territories). 20 5
202. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Liatram, 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding that making pieces
of a patented device and then exporting them to be put together into the total claimed device
was not infringement under U.S. patent laws).
203. Even though the defendant in Deepsouth did not form the whole claimed unit, the
defendant had possession of all the pieces at one time. One distinguishing feature is that the
time serial device does not have possession of all the pieces at one time as did the defendant in
Deepsouth. However, it seems clear that if one infringes a patent by making the N components
of the claimed device in one day (N being a finite positive integer), the patent infringer could
not avoid liability by making and shipping each of the components to a foreign country in non-
overlapping and separate time periods. The final result and damage is the same, and this slight
factual distinction should not absolve one of liability where infringement would otherwise be
found.
204. See Liatram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd sub
non. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
205. 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (1988).
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Many federal cases after Deepsouth followed the Supreme
Court's line of reasoning where a combination patent containing
many elements is infringed only where the operational whole of the
assembly is created in the United States.2 06 The Supreme Court's
Deepsouth decision left a big hole in the patent law whereby foreign
infringement could not be stopped even if the parts were completely
manufactured in the United States. However, aware of the loophole
and the tension created by Deepsouth, the Federal Circuit in Paper
Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.20 7 found that the
manufacture of the parts of a machine, in a manner similar to time
serial copies on the Internet, constituted infringement even though
the parts were not completely pieced together into a final total unit.
The Court in Magna-Graphics expressly stated, "If without fear of
liability a competitor can assemble a patented item past the point of
testing,... [n]othing would prohibit the unscrupulous competitor
from aggressively marketing its own product and constructing it to
all but the final screws and bolts." 208
Furthermore, in response to the hole created by Deepsouth and
the extensive dissent and firm reluctance to comply with Deepsouth
in the lower courts, Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) 20 9 and 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).2 10 Since the passage of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) and
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2), creating the pieces of an invention for pres-
entation to someone else anywhere external to the United States for
206. See Decca Ltd v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Lang v. Pacific Ma-
rine and Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
207. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir 1984).
208. Id. at 19.
209. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) provides: Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a pat-
ented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner
as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States,
shall be liable as an infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (1988).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) provides: Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially
made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce..., where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such
component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined outside
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (1988).
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assembly into the final device is infringement in the United States.211
It seems highly possible that an additional application of 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) will be to attempt to make the creation of time serial
copies of patented invention infringement when exportation to an-
other country occurs due to the Internet transmission. If one is trans-
ferring data from Japan to Germany on the Internet, it is possible
that only a fraction, say 70%, of the program will pass through the
United States due to the connectionless manner in which the TCP/IP
protocol operates.212 Even in this case, if the 70% was a "substantial
portion" of the patented invention, liability may be found under 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). Even worse, a single TCP/IP datagram may be
viewed as being a "component" which is "specially adapted" to be
pieced together with the rest of the program communicated else-
where over the Internet. Therefore, even if one TCP/IP datagram
crosses the United States, liability could be found under 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) since the one datagram may be "any component
... that is especially made or... adapted for use in the invention."
This may also mean any state in which a time serial copy is made
will subject a defendant to subject matter jurisdiction in that state.
Even if the time serial copy is not direct infringement via the above
discussion, direct infringement by virtue of an inevitable final slav-
ish total copy will open the door for contributory infringement in-
volving any time serial copy on the Internet.213
V. VicAIous LIABILITY AND INDUCEMENT
Theories of vicarious liability and inducement can be used to
find culpable and/or volitional Internet-enabling entities liable while
offering justified protection to passive Internet-enabling entities. If
211. Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Bremer, 893 F. Supp. 863, 872 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (finding
that Deepsouth arguments are ineffective today on summary judgment due to 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)). See also ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 740 (1992)
("This section [ § 271(f)] overruled Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., which had held
that exporting components of a patented combination for quick assembly overseas was not
infringement.").
212. See discussion supra Part III.A. for a more detailed discussion of the connectionless
TCP/IP protocol.
213. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Liatram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972) (holding that if
the defendant's conduct was intended to lead to the unauthorized use of the patented device
inside the United States, its production and sales activity would be subject of injunction as an
induced or contributory infringement).
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the Internet enabling entity induced the infringement or exercised
control over the user and obtained financial benefit as a direct result
of the infringing activity, then a finding of direct infringement li-
ability would be justified. In contrast, it is unreasonable to expose
passive Internet enabling entities to direct infringement liability as
suggested by Sega and Frena. Therefore, the use of vicarious liabil-
ity and inducement may obviate the need for any finding of direct
infringement due to Internet transmissions on the part of Internet-
enabling entities, while still deterring infringement and ensuring that
plaintiffs obtain a proper remedy. 214
The theory of inducement is not likely to cause too much con-
troversy on the Internet. If a defendant solicits for infringing mate-
rial, advertises his services knowingly for infringing activity, or in-
structs an individual to infringe, few would take issue with a finding
of liability.215 However, vicarious liability may pose a few prob-
lems. Many Internet service providers exercise control over the use
and content of their service. These same Internet service providers
may charge service fees on a per access basis, a per download basis,
a per upload basis, and/or a time of use basis. When using one or
more of these payment forms, the argument can be made that defen-
dant service provider has benefited directly from the infringing ac-
tivity. On the other hand, one may argue, as was discussed above
for direct infringement via Netcom, that total 100% policing and
control over the Internet is not technically feasible or cost effective
and that the level of control for Internet service providers should not
be enough to expose service providers to liability.
Thus, while few may object with imposing liability on Internet-
enabling entities who actively induce infringement, some may object
to the use of vicarious liability as a dominant liability theory for the
214. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. at 787 (1984) (noting the
"historic kinship between patent law and copyright law" in using patent standards for vicarious
liability in copyright case); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2 Cir.
1963) (even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship one may be vicariously li-
able if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct fi-
nancial interest in such activities)
215. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). See also Water Techs. Corp. v. Gartner, 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("[A] person infringes by actively and knowingly aiding and abetting another's di-
rect infringement. Although section 271(b) does not use the word "knowing," the case law and
legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement.").
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transmission of hacked software over the Internet. Vicarious liabil-
ity may hold an Internet-enabling entity liable for patent infringe-
ment by virtue of the payment structure used that entity. Imposing
liability under this situation may cause such Internet-enabling enti-
ties to change the payment relationship with their users in an attempt
to avoid vicarious liability without actually deterring the infringing
activity. Likewise, an Internet-enabling entity may be found liable
for a user's infringing activity simply by the manner in which that
entity controls user access to system resources. This scenario also
creates a less than perfect result since Internet-enabling entities
would then purposely take less active roles in policing their systems
to avoid vicarious liability. Thus, vicarious liability, while offering
a slightly better Internet liability structure than a broadly interpreted,
direct infringement theory, may adversely affect growth on the In-
ternet.
VI. SETTLED CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT LAW PROVIDES PATENT
INFRINGEMENT PROTECTION TO NONVOLITIONAL INTERNET-ENABLING
ENTITIES
In addition to the relatively reasonable finding of infringement,
or noninfringement, under the theories of vicarious liability, induce-
ment, and direct infringement with volitional acts, it is reasonable
that contributory infringement should also be used to find culpable
Internet-enabling entities liable for patent infringement while shel-
tering passive Internet-enabling entities from liability. This section
shows that well-settled contributory infringement law provides am-
ple protection to the nonvolitional Internet-enabling entity so that
massive patent infringement liability will most likely never result for
the nonvolitional defendant. If a passive Internet-enabling entity can
avoid a finding of direct infringement and force a plaintiff to prove
vicarious liability, inducement, and/or contributory infringement, the
passive Internet-enabling defendant is in a much more secure posi-
tion whereas the volitional Internet-enabling entity is likely to be
found liable in either circumstance.
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A. Requirements of Contributory Infringement
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) is the federal statutory authority for patent
contributory infringement, and it provides:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial nonin-
fringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
Federal case law interpreted § 271(c) as requiring the com-
plaintant to show that: (1) direct infringement has occurred; (2) the
defendant has contributed a material part to the combination infring-
ing the patent; (3) knowledge on the part of the defendant that its
component was used in the infringement of a patent or especially de-
signed, made, or adapted for infringement of the patent; and (4) the
part contributed by the defendant was not "a staple article" or com-
modity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use. 216
The sections below outline how a nonvolitional Internet-enabling
entity can use: (1) the "knowledge" requirement, and (2) the
"substantial non-infringing use" or "staple article" requirement of
contributory infringement to avoid liability under contributory in-
fringement.
B. Material Component Requirement and Lack of Direct In-
fiingement Are Not Likely to Avoid Internet Liability
The direct infringement requirement offers little shelter since
there will most likely be direct infringement somewhere within the
United States unless the Internet transmission begins in a foreign
country and is destined for a foreign country. If the transmission is
from a foreign country to a destination foreign country, then the
TCP/IP Internet protocol may not result in one computer or memory
216. Marsh-McBimey, Inc. v. Jennings, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621, 1625 (C.D. Cal.
1991); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Preemption Devices, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 1170, 1174 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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structure in the United States containing an entire 100% memory
copy of the entire software or data structure that is claimed. There-
fore, the direct infringement requirement 217 of a contributory in-
fringement finding is not extensively addressed herein, since it offers
little protection to nonvolitional Internet-enabling entities.
In addition, the "material" requirement of contributory in-
fringement will offer little aid since "material" typically is inter-
preted to be any element "recited in the claim." 218  If either the
hardware or software in a software patent claim is provided by the
defendant, then the defendant will most probably have contributed a
material component to the act of infringement.
In summary, the "direct infringement" requirement and
"material" requirement offer little aid to the passive Internet-
enabling entity looking to avoid liability for a hacker's activities.
C. Lack of Knowledge or Intent- The First Line of Defense
From Liability
Contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) also re-
quires that the defendant have some knowledge. Based upon the
existing case law, it is uncertain whether or not the "knowledge" re-
quirement mandates that the defendant know his component is being
used in a particular manner or know that this particular use of his
component is infringement of a patent.219 In either case, many Inter-
net-enabling entities do not have any knowledge whatsoever as to
how their components, services, and computers are being used at any
given time. Many Internet-enabling entities may not even know that
their products or services are being used on the Internet. Many more
entities will not know when, how, where, or why the infringing ac-
217. Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 876 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Absent direct infringement of patent claims, there can be neither contribu-
tory infringement nor inducement of infringement" [under 35 U.S.C. § 271].); Hodosh v.
Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575, 1578 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (direct infringement is a prerequi-
site for contributory infringement); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d
684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Absent direct infringement of the patent claims, there can be nei-
ther contributory infringement ... nor inducement of infringement.").
218. Conner Peripherals, Inc. v. Western Digital Corp., No. C-93-20117, 1993 WL
645932, at *8 (N.D.Cal. 1993).
219. See Freedman v. Friedman, 242 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1957); Buxton, Inc. v. Julen, Inc.,
223 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Aro Mfg., 377 U.S. at 482-83.
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tivity occurred. Certainly, few if any of the Internet-enabling com-
panies will know of a specific hacking incident either during its oc-
currence or before it occurs in order to have the requisite knowledge.
The total lack of any knowledge on the part of Internet hard-
ware manufacturers, Intemet service providers, Internet resource op-
erators, Internet software vendors, and telecommunication corpora-
tions ought to result in no liability under theories of contributory
infringement. However, an Intemet-enabling entity that is volition-
ally involved in the copying and solicitation of illegal copies will
most likely have the requisite intent and be found liable under a
contributory theory. Therefore, the intent requirement of contribu-
tory infringement, like elements of vicarious liability and induce-
ment, is better suited than a broad interpretation of direct infringe-
ment for properly determining liability on the part of the volitional
Internet-enabling entities while protecting passive Internet-enabling
entities from unjustified liability.
D. Staple Good, Non-Infringing Use, and Lack of Special
Making or Adaptation - The Second Line of Defense
In addition to lack of knowledge or intent, the defendant may
argue that the memory devices, protocols, software, and CPUs on the
Internet are either staple goods of commerce or have substantial non-
infringing use. 2 0 One way to prove a defendant's contribution is a
staple contribution is to demonstrate that the use of the good is inci-
dental or non-critical to the infringement of the claims. 221 This ar-
220. Oak Indus., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 726 F. Supp. 1525, 1538-39 (N.D. 111. 1989)
("If the practice of the patented method is incidental and necessary to the practice of the unpat-
ented methods, the device is a staple and there can be no contributory infringement. If... the
practice of the patented method is not necessary or incidental to practice of the unpatented
methods, a jury could find that the device as a whole is not staple and the seller could be liable
for contributory infringement.").
221. For case law on "staple" goods, see Oak Indus., 726 F. Supp. 1525 (N.D. I11. 1989);
Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 426 (1984) (listing common,
consumable office supplies as staple goods); Oxy Metal Indus. Corp. v. Quin-Tee, Inc., 216
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 318, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1982). Typically, only consumables or inexpensive
material that have wide application are found to be staple. See Eversharp, Inc. v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 778, 786 (E.D. Va. 1966) (holding that razor blades in shaving apparatus
are staple products); Haskell v. Lever Bros. Co., 243 F. Supp. 601, 614 (S.D.N.Y 1965)
(determining that soap is a staple product); Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that if defendants' goods are staple articles, the Court must determine
whether the allegedly infiinging device constitutes a material part of the invention); Haworth,
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gument is not actually a decent defense since memory, microproces-
sors, and like technology are crucial to the operation of the Internet.
The Internet will not function without these components. Alterna-
tively, a defendant may argue his components are consumable. Sta-
ple goods are oftentimes viewed as being consumable goods having
a low cost and short lifetime.222 Many memory ICs and CPUs are
not repaired after use, but instead are thrown out and replaced once
they cease to function. Furthermore, some memory devices and mi-
crocontrollers do cost less than one dollar. Therefore, some CPUs
and memory devices on the Internet may be very similar to consum-
able products while other memory and CPU devices may not be easy
to classify as a consumable good. However, it is improbable,
though, that all memory and CPUs on the Internet are consumable
since there lifetime is typically many years in length and their cost is
a large portion of most computer systems.
Rather, it is highly probable that a typical U.S. home contains
tens or hundreds of CPUs and memory devices. Automobiles alone
may contain tens of processors and many memory devices. Further
increasing this household total are almost all home appliances, some
children's toys, stereo systems, TVs, computers, furnaces, air condi-
tioners, home security systems, VCRs, video cameras, remote con-
trols, lighting systems, and so on. As memory and CPUs become
more of an integral part of our society, it is even more likely that
these items will be considered staple or commonplace by virtue of
lower cost, substantial non-infringing use, consumable nature of re-
placement, high degree of alternative devices, and so forth. There-
fore, an argument along the lines of "staple good" or lack of "special
making or adaptation" may aid in avoiding liability under patent
theories of contributory infringement in addition to the lack of
knowledge/intent.
Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080, 1088 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (assessing
whether a product is a staple article of commerce by the quality, quantity and efficiency of the
suggested alternate uses).
222. See, for example, Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 426 (1984) (listing common, consumable
office supplies as staple goods).
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The courts are more inclined to find no liability if the contrib-
uted component is used in many other non-infringing manners.223
Very few memory devices and microprocessors are designed espe-
cially for use on the Internet. Many memory devices and processors
are used for computers not connected to the Internet, for automotive
applications, for medical devices, for consumer electronics such as
stereos, cellular phones, microwave ovens, etc., for children's toys,
for industrial manufacturing, and the list goes on and on. Even if a
processor or memory was specifically designed only for use on the
Internet, the Internet is not used only for infringing activity. Even a
CPU or memory device specifically designed for Internet will be
used for Internet transmissions that are noninfringing. For every
hacked piece of software stolen or illegally used on the Internet,
many more legal and noninfringing programs, e-mail messages, and
data are transmitted.2 4 Furthermore, memory devices and CPUs in
the Internet computers could be replaced by nearly an infinite num-
ber of other memory devices and CPUs manufactured by other legal
entities and still remain fully functional since memory and CPUs are
usually not specially adapted for use only on the Internet. These
substantial non-infringing uses are very tangible and are not "far-
fetched", "illusory", or "theoretical" non-infringing uses.225
Therefore, the staple products limitations and substantial non-
infringing use criterion of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) should provide sub-
stantial protection from liability for nonvolitional or passive Internet-
enabling entities.
VII. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The Internet and modem computer systems are high speed mi-
cro-factories which have caused a stir in the intellectual property
223. See Mirafi, Inc. v. Murphy, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussing
other substantial, non-infringing uses for invention).
224. Cf Sony Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 788 ("[A] sale of
an article which though adapted to an infringing use is also adapted to other and lawful uses, is
not enough to make the seller a contributory infringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of
commerce." (quoting Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912))).
225. See Preemption Devices v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 630 F. Supp. 463, 471 (E.D.
Pa 1985) (stating that plaintiff has the burden of proving contributing infringer knows that the
component part is made especially for an infringing use and that the component is not suitable
for another substantial, noninfringing use), vacated inpart by 803 F.2d 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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community. Modem computers and the Internet are capable of
making and distributing millions of copies of data and/or software
programs to millions of end users in very brief periods of time.
Modem technology often allows judgment-proof entities to inflict
massive amounts of damages in a short period of time via the mass-
transmission of these copies. The technology itself may even hide
the human hacker/infringer from legal detection via anonymous re-
mailing, encryption, compression, and/or the like. Furthermore, un-
like other creations of copies outside of cyberspace, every infringing
transmission on the Internet and every infringing copy of software
made on a computer system involves the use of equipment, software,
services, etc., of hundreds of commercial entities, many of which are
fortune 500 companies. Who is to bear the loss when the human
hacker/infringer cannot pay for the damage done in cyberspace? In
other words, should the Internet enabling entities226 bear the risk of
the loss or should the data/software owners shoulder the risk of loss
for massive Internet infringement?
Copyright law has, in the past few years, been forced to deal
with this situation as pictures, art, text, data bases, and like copy-
righted work, have become common passengers on the Internet. By
liberally applying direct infringement theories articulated in Sega
and Frena, it seems that courts have taken the opportunity to shift
the risk of loss for copyright infringement onto the Intemet-enabling
entities. However, case law, including Netcom and Sony, suggest the
opposite policy, where direct infringement should not apply to Inter-
net-enabling entities. Netcom suggests that the lack of intent and
volition on the part of an Intemet-enabling entity should shield the
passive Intemet-enabling entity from direct liability.
As the battle rages on in copyright law on the Internet, a new
war threatens to emerge. Recent CAFC patent law decisions, such
as Alappat, Beauregard, Lowry, Warmerdam, and Trovato, have re-
sulted in the recent issuance of new types of software patent claims
that could be infringed by software or database transmission over the
Internet. In addition to the issuance of these new claims, the tech-
nological advances in both the size and speed of the Internet have
226. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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enabled more frequent software communications, data transmissions,
and patent-protected commercial transactions over the Internet than
ever before. Due to these changes in the law, technology, and mar-
ket, plaintiffs harmed by wrongful acts committed on the Internet
may soon decide to plead patent infringement in addition to or in
lieu of copyright infringement in the near future. The lack of Inter-
net patent infringement case law, the uncertainty as to the true
course of the law in the patent-similar strict liability copyright arena,
and the lack of the troublesome fixation requirement in patent law
may be especially attractive to a plaintiff seeking redress for in-
fringing software transmission or data base transmission on the In-
ternet.
The courts have yet to decide whether any Internet-enabling
entities will be liable under direct infringement or shielded from di-
rect infringement by a lack of volition. It seems unreasonable that
patent law would follow a broad application of the holding in Sega
and Frena and find nonculpable and nonvolitional Internet-enabling
entities liable for the potentially massive damage created via a single
uncontrolled transmission over the Internet. The theories of con-
tributory infringement, vicarious liability, and inducement along
with the policies outlined in Netcom and Sony, seem best suited to
patent infringement liability on the Internet, so that volitional and/or
culpable Internet-enabling entities are deterred from infringement or
found liable for infringement while nonvolitional or passive Internet-
enabling entities are not chilled from further Internet innovation.
